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TAX TREATMENTS FOR DISTRESSED BANK LOANS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES AND
JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEMS
Yo Otat
Abstract: A number of commentators in Japan have argued that tax treatments for
distressed bank loans seem to be more generous in Japan than in the United States, and
that, in contrast to Japan, the United States does not allow any deduction for loan loss
reserves. However, such arguments have not been based upon a careful analysis of case
law and actual tax authority practices. This Article presents a comparative study of the
tax treatments for distressed bank loans in the United States and Japan. It analyzes
corporate income tax legislation, administrative practices and case law in the 1980s and
1990s and explores several major differences between the United States and Japan with
respect to the treatment of distressed bank loans. Based on this analysis, this Article
challenges the traditional view of comparative tax treatments in these two countries and
contends that Japanese tax treatments provide insufficient incentives for banks to
expedite the disposal of distressed loans. Finally, this Article suggests possible
legislative approaches for establishing a workable legal scheme that provides more
economically neutral and internationally harmonized tax treatments for distressed bank
loans in Japan.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Japanese media has repeatedly stated that the 1990s was the "lost
decade" for Japan. ' On the last business day of 1989,2 the Dow-Jones
Industrial Average ("Dow Jones Average") in New York City registered
only 2753, while on the Nikkei Average 225 ("Nikkei Average") the
standard stock price index for the Tokyo Stock Exchange, peaked at 38,915.
In sharp contrast, on the last business day of 19993 the Dow-Jones Average
reported a high closing figure of 11,453 and the Nikkei Average closed at
only 18,934. Of course, the United States suffered serious financial setbacks
in the 1980s. Nine hundred twelve savings and loan institutions ("S&Ls")
went bankrupt between 1981 and 1983. 4 Further, a second severe crisis hit
the U.S. financial industry between 1986 and 1992. 5 As a result, 1142 S&Ls
and 1395 commercial banks closed, and the U.S. government spent nearly
6$125 billion to manage these crises.
The Japanese financial crisis of the 1990s, however, was even more
devastating in its scale and nature than that experienced by the United States.
By the end of 1998, three of twenty-one Japanese money-center banks had
become insolvent and were reorganized by the government,
7 and the fourth8
and seventh 9 largest securities firms had gone bankrupt. As a result, the
Japanese government injected approximately 1.8 trillion yen (0.4% of Gross
Domestic Product ("GDP")) into twenty-one major commercial banks in
March of 1998.10 In October 1998, the Japanese government set aside sixty
trillion yen (approximately 12% of the GDP) to strengthen the banking
sector. Of this amount, twenty-five trillion yen was earmarked for
recapitalizing weak but solvent banks, eighteen trillion yen for dealing with
insolvent banks through nationalization and liquidation, and seventeen
trillion yen for full deposit protection of insolvent banks to prevent the
See, e.g., USHIO SHIOTA, KIN'YU ARUIGOKU [THE FINANCIAL DOODLEBUG] 340 (1999).
2 Dec. 29, 1989.
3 Dec. 30, 1999.
4 See, e.g., SHIOTA, supra note 1, at 243.
5 Id.
6 See, e.g., AKIYOSHI HORIUCHI, KIN'YO SHISUTEMU No MIRAI: FURYO SAIKEN MONDAI To BIGGU
BAN [THE FUTURE OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: DISTRESSED LOAN PROBLEM AND THE "BIG BANG"] 30
(1998).
7 These three were: (1) the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Ltd.; (2) the Long-Term Credit Bank of
Japan Ltd.; and (3) the Nippon Credit Bank Ltd.
8 Yamaichi Securities Co., Ltd.
9 Sanyo Securities Co., Ltd.
'0 See, e.g., TbkyO Mitsubishi Gin, Getsu-nai 1000 Oku En [The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi plans to
repay 100 billion yen to the Government by the end of February], NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, morning
edition, Feb. 22, 2000, at 7 [hereinafter Tokyo-Mitsubishi].
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Japanese economy from plunging into a serious financial panic."
Subsequently, the Japanese government injected a total of 7.5 trillion yen
into fifteen money-center banks for their recapitalization. 1
2
Losses resulting from the collapse of the Japanese "bubble" economy
amounted to 1285 trillion yen (730 trillion yen in real property and 555
trillion yen in stocks).' 3 This figure roughly equaled Japan's GDP for a
period of two and a half years.' 4 This catastrophe resulted in a loss of assets
far greater than the asset losses experienced by Japan during World War 11.15
The collapse of the Japanese economy and its marked contrast with the
performance of the U.S. economy in the 1990s has caused many Japanese
economists and journalists to dub this period as "Japan's second defeat."'' 6
Though economists offer differing hypotheses about the reasons for
this Japanese banking crisis and depression,' 7 there seems to be consensus
on one issue: the decisive factor that prolonged this depression was the delay
by Japanese financial institutions in disposing of distressed loans.'
8
Although there are many explanations as to how the delay led the
Japanese economy to an extended depression, some economists focus on
how such a delay unnecessarily "taps-out" cash. 19 If a bank does not charge
off or establish loan loss reserves for its distressed loans on a timely basis,
its profits will be overstated in its financial statements.20 Overstated profits,
in turn, lead to higher corporate income taxes than if appropriate accounting
practices were in place to account for bad debt. 2 1 Also, higher profits
increase the pressure to pay dividends and officer bonuses. 22 Thus, Japanese
banks' delay in disposing of their distressed loans in the 1990s caused them
to tap out a huge amount of previously retained earnings. As a result, the
deterioration of their capital base, principally caused by the drastic decline in
11 See Akihiro Kanaya & David Woo, The Japanese Banking Crisis of the 1990s: Sources and
Lessons, INT'L MONETARY FUND WORKING PAPER No. 7, at 32 (2000).
12 See Tokyo-Mitsubishi, supra note 10, at 7.
13 See YOSHIMASA NISHIMURA, KIN'YO GYOSEI NO HAItN [CAUSES OF THE FAILURES OF THE
SUPERVISION OVER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS] 247 (1999).
" See id.
15 See id. The aggregate losses suffered by Japan during World War II was roughly equivalent to
Japan's GDP for only a one year period in the 1940s. Id.
16 See NISHIMURA, supra note 13, at 5.
17 For example, economists at the IMF have argued that weak corporate governance and regulatory
forbearance stifled any incentive for meaningful restructuring of banks as well as their corporate borrowers
and that these two factors contributed to what might have been an unnecessary prolongation of the crisis.
See Kanaya & Woo, supra note 11, at 5.
1S See, e.g., HORIUCHI, supra note 6, at 33, 54.
19 See, e.g., id. at 21-22, 53-54.
20 See, e.g., id. at 21-22.
21 See id.
22 See id.
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stock and real estate prices, was expedited and enhanced. This tapping-out
process was amplified by the unique Japanese corporate practice of paying
consistent, though not high, dividends regardless of company performance.
2
As a result, from 1991 through 1997,4 Japanese banks had paid out,
in the aggregate, approximately 5.5 trillion yen in dividends and 9.2 trillion
yen in taxes. 25 Such dividends and taxes were paid out despite the fact that,
even by the Ministry of Finance's ("MOF") modest estimates, the total
amount of distressed loans held by the twenty-one money-center banks in
Japan as of the end of September 1992 had already reached 12.3 trillion
yen.
26
This erosion of Japanese bank capital bases of contributed to cutbacks
on lending, as banks began to fail the capital ratio requirement of the
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and .Capital Standards
("Basle Capital Accord.") 27  These cutbacks in lending meant less funds
were available for possible purchases of real estate during this period.28 This
led to the deterioration of the Japanese real estate market, and made it
difficult for banks to liquidate the collateral securing their distressed loans,
which was mostly in the form of real estate. 29 This liquidation problem in
turn amplified the deterioration of the "market" value of loan assets held by
23 See Kanaya & Woo, supra note 11, at 27. This practice was possibly attributable to the belief
(shared by the bank regulatory authorities) that the suspension of dividends would be a signal of distress
and would lead to a sharp fall in bank stock prices or possibly even to a run on the banks. Id.
24 1997 was the year in which the Japanese bank regulatory agency officially declared that the total
amount of distressed loans held by Japanese national banks reached 76.7 trillion yen. TSUNEHIKO OSHIMA
& YOSHIAKI NISHIMURA, FURYO SAIKEN RYODO-KA No SHIKUMI To ZEIMU [FRAMEWORK OF
LIQUIDATION OF AND TAx TREATMENTS FOR DISTRESSED LOANS] 68 (1999).
25 See Kanaya & Woo, supra note 11, at 41 tbl. 10.
26 NISHIMURA, supra note 13, at 119.
27 Agreement on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, July
1988, 30 I.L.M. 967 [hereinafter Basle Capital Accord]. For the detailed explanation of this Accord, see
HAL S. SCOTT & SHINSAKU IWAHARA, IN SEARCH OF A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE BASLE CAPITAL ACCORD IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES (Group of Thirty, Occasional Papers No.
46, 1994). This book was translated into Japanese by Prof. Shinsaku Iwahara. See Shinsaku Iwahara &
Hal S. Scott, Gink5 no Jikoshihon Hiritsu Kisei ni kansuru Bdzeru G6i no Nichibei ni okeru Gutaika I [In
Search of a Level Playing Field: the Implement of the Basle Capital Accord in Japan and the United States
1], 1354 SHOJI HOMU 49 (1994); Shinsaku Iwahara & Hal S. Scott, Gink5 no Jikoshihon Hiritsu Kisei ni
kansuru Bdzeru Gdi no Nichibei ni okeru Gutaika 11 [In Search of a Level Playing Field: the Implement of
the Basle Capital Accord in Japan and the United States 1], 1355 SHOJI HOMu 2 (1994); Shinsaku Iwahara
& Hal S. Scott, Gink5 no Jikoshihon Hiritsu Kisei ni kansuru Bdzeru Gi no Nichibei ni okeru Gutaika III
[In Search of a Level Playing Field: the Implement of the Basle Capital Accord in Japan and the United
States I1], 1356 SHOJI HOMu 14 (1994) [Iwahara & Scott III]; Shinsaku Iwahara & Hal S. Scott, Gink5 no
Jikoshihon Hiritsu Kisei ni kansuru Bdzeru Gdi no Nichibei ni okeru Gutaika IV [In Search of a Level
Playing Field: the Implement of the Basle Capital Accord in Japan and the United States IV], 1357 SHOJI
HOMU 19 (1994) [hereinafter Iwahara & Scott IV].
28 See SHIOTA, supra note 1, 252-53.
29 See Shazo Noda, Fury5 Saiken no Kashidaore Sonshitsu [Charge-off of Distressed Loans], 16
ZEIMU JIREI KENKYO 31,47 (1993).
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banks and accelerated the erosion of their capital bases, which exacerbated
the "credit crunch" phenomenon. 30 As a result of this vicious circle, the
financial condition of Japanese banks throughout the 1990s was significantly
undermined and the depression of the Japanese economy became
increasingly serious. Based upon these observations, many economists
argue that the delay in disposing of distressed loans contributed, at least
partially, to the prolonging of the Japanese economy's depression.
3 1
While this Article is not intended to question or examine the existence
or processes of this vicious circle, it establishes that Japanese tax treatments
for the disposition of distressed bank loans did not offer sufficient incentives
to Japanese banks, especially when compared to those offered by the United
States. This comparative study of the tax treatments in the United States and
Japan is primarily designed to illustrate the significant differences in the tax
treatments afforded by these two countries. This Article therefore explores
several major differences in tax treatments between the United States and
Japan with respect to the disposition of distressed bank loans. Part II
provides some background on how the U.S. and Japanese tax systems treat
distressed bank loans. Part III outlines the major differences between the
United States' and Japan's treatment of distressed loans. Part IV discusses
the relative insufficiency of incentives given to Japanese banks to dispose of
their distressed loans and suggests possible legislative approaches for
establishing a workable legal scheme for more "harmonized" and
economically neutral tax treatments for distressed bank loans in Japan.
Emphasis is placed on legislation, administrative practice, and case law
relating to corporate income tax in the 1980s and 1990s in connection with
the bank loans in question.
II. BASIC TAX TREATMENTS FOR DISTRESSED BANK LOANS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
A. Basic Structures of Corporate Income Tax in the United States and
Japan
The United States and Japan differ in the legislative structure of their
income tax laws. In the United States, all federal domestic taxes are set
forth in a single code called the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 ("IRC"). In
30 See NISHIMURA, supra note 13, at 86-87, 223-26. "Credit Crunch Phenomenon" is the
phenomenon in which many banks and other financial institutions become extremely reluctant to make new
or additional loans and are moving to withdraw their existing loans. Id.
31 See, e.g., HORIUCHI, supra note 6, at 33, 54.
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Japan, it is a general principle of legislation to enact separate statutes for
each specific national tax.32 Further, the Japanese national corporate income
tax system is independent from the national individual income tax system.
Accordingly, the Corporation Tax Act 33 ("CTA") governs the national
corporate income tax, and the Income Tax Act ("ITA"), 34 controls income
tax for individuals.
In spite of this difference in legislative structure, the national
corporate income tax provisions of the United States and those of Japan
share many common features. Under both systems, corporations ordinarily
may not deduct the dividends they pay to their shareholders. As a result,
corporate income is subject to what has been called a "double-tax;" the
funds are taxed once at the corporate level and again as "income" distributed
to shareholders via dividends.35 Both the United States and Japan maintain a
global system 36 and do not adopt a schedular system 37 for national corporate
income tax. 38  In other words, both systems aggregate all income and
expenses and then tax the net. Thus, in both Japan and the United States, the
amount of tax payable by a corporation is calculated in its basic form using
the following formula:
(taxable income attributable to taxpayer corp.) x (tax rates)
- (applicable tax credits)
= amount of tax payable
39
It is widely accepted that both the United States and Japanese
corporate income tax system have adopted the Haig-Simons4 ° definition of
2 HIROSHI KANEKO, SOZEI HO [TAX LAW] 105 (7th ed. 1999).
33 H6jin-zei h6 [Corporation Tax Act], Law No. 34 of 1965 [hereinafter CTA 1965] (Japan).
34 Shotoku-zei h6 [Income Tax Act], Law No. 33 of 1965 (Japan).
35 BERNARD WOLFMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE 3 (3d ed. 1990).
KANEKO, supra note 32, at 232, 238. It should be noted, however, that since Japanese corporations have
traditionally had modest dividend payout rates and Japanese individual investors instead have tended to
cash out corporate earnings as capital gains (subject to a much lower-rate of capital gain taxes, in general,
26%), this double tax has been largely illusory at least in Japan.
36 Global system taxation is a method of income taxation under which all income and expenses are
added up to determine the net of gross income and gross expenses, which is then taxed.
37 Schedular system taxation is another method of income taxation. Under this method, the net of
each type of income (i.e., capital gain and salary income) and relevant costs relating thereto are taxed
separately at a tax rate that is fixed for each type of income.
38 Despite their similarities as global systems, unlike the United States, Japan does not give favorable
treatment to capital gains for purposes of the corporate income tax.
39 Neither the United States nor the Japanese system invokes the concepts of "adjusted" gross
income, standard deduction or itemized deduction for corporate income tax. Therefore, corporations
simply subtract all allowable deductions from gross profits or revenue to obtain taxable income under both
systems.
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"income.,, 4 1 Under the Haig-Simons model, "income" is the "net accretion
to one's economic power between two points in time." 42  Phrased
differently, income consists of the taxpayer's consumption for a period of
time, plus the "change in the value of the store of the [taxpayer's] property
rights between the beginning and end of the period in question. '4  Thus, the
determination of Haig-Simons income necessitates the use of a "mark-to-
market" system, under which a taxpayer's income is determined by
reference to changes in the market value of the taxpayer's assets and
liabilities, even though the taxpayer has not disposed of these assets and
liabilities or otherwise "realized" gain or loss.
44
However, because of the intractable administrative problems
accompanying the full taxation of economic income, 45 both the U.S. system
and the Japanese system generally delay the recognition of income until that
income has been "realized" instead of using a mark-to-market system.4 6
Realization is defined as the occurrence of an act or event such as a sale that
signifies a change in the form of assets or properties sufficient to attract
taxation.47 A full application of the Haig-Simons model would necessitate
annual estimates of market values that would be extremely subjective in
nature, costly, and the source of innumerable disputes between taxpayers
and the tax authority.48 Moreover, basing taxable income on economic gain
not yet reduced to liquid wealth could impose significant hardships on
taxpayers unable to pay the tax owed because of the illiquid nature of the
4 The term "Haig-Simons income" was coined after the names of Robert Haig and Henry Simons,
two of the more prominent proponents of designing the tax base to reflect economic income. See Robert
Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7(1921),
reprinted in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION (1959); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME
TAXATION 50 (1938).
41 As to the adoption of this definition in the U.S. corporate income tax, see MICHAEL J. GRAETZ &
DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 107 (3d ed. 1995). As for
the adoption of this definition in Japanese corporate income tax, see KANEKO, supra note 32, at 171, 245.
42 Haig, supra note 40, at 7.
43 SIMONS, supra note 40, at 50.
4 Id. at 100. See also Thomas L. Evans, The Evolution of Federal Income Tax Accounting-A
Growing Trend Towards Mark-to-Market?, 67 TAXES 824, 825 (1989); Minoru Nakazato, Sozei-h6 to
Kigy6 Kaikei (Sh6-h6, Kaikeigaku) [Tax Laws and Corporate Accountings (Commercial Code and
Accountings)], 1432 SHOJI HOMu 26, 29 (1996).
45 Haig and Simons themselves each recognized such administrative problems. See Haig, supra note
40, at 68-69; SIMONS, supra note 40, at 103.
46 See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 41, at 160-61; KANEKO, supra note 32, at 244-45. See also
Nakazato, supra note 44, at 29.
47 See Evans, supra note 44, at 825.
48 Id.
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economic gain. 49 Despite the principles of realization recognized in both the
United States and Japan, both countries have experienced a notable trend of
mark-to-market in tax accounting in recent years. 5°
With respect to the scope of the allowable deductions for income tax
purposes, there are significant differences between the U.S. system and the
Japanese system. For example, under Section 162 of the IRC, a deduction is
allowed for business expenses that are the "ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business." 51 In contrast, the Japanese corporate income tax system does not
require that business expenses be "ordinary" to be deductible5 2 Under both
systems, it is unquestionable that losses arising from distressed bank loans
may, to some extent, be deducted from gross income as business expenses
for the purpose of determining corporate income tax.
53
Both the U.S. and the Japanese systems use progressive tax rates that
generally increase as corporate income rises. Currently, the U.S. corporate
income tax system uses a four-tier rate structure. The stated marginal rates
54
of taxation for corporate income are 15%, 25%, 34%, and 35%. 55
Corporations with taxable incomes over $100,000 are subject to a 5% surtax
with a cap of $11,750, and corporations with taxable incomes over
$15,000,000 are subject to an additional 3% surtax with a cap of $100,000.56
In contrast, the Japanese corporate income tax system uses a one-tier rate
structure for business corporations, with the exception that a two-tier rate
49 Id. See also Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 PENN.
L. REv. 1111, 1168-76 (1986), for liquidity concerns regarding a mark-to-market system and proposed
solutions to those concerns.
50 See generally Evans, supra note 44; Nakazato, supra note 44, at 29. See also MINORU
NAKAZATO, KIN'YO TORIHIKI To KAZEI: KIN'Y0 KAKUMEI-KA No SOZEI-HO [THE TAXATION OF
FINANCIAL TRANSACTION: TAX LAW UNDER THE FINANCIAL REVOLUTION] 76-89 (1998).
S For more detailed discussion as to the meaning of "ordinary and necessary" under the IRC, see
GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 41, at 28-29, 236-41.
52 See KANEKO, supra note 32, at 246.
" I.R.C. § 166(a) (1994). See BORIS I. BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 2 FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 33-1 (2d ed., 1990). See also KANEKO, supra note 32, at 287. Unless
otherwise indicated, all citations are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1994.
54 "Marginal tax rate" is the rate of tax applicable to the last dollar of taxable income of the relevant
taxpayer. It should be distinguished from "average tax rate," which is applicable to taxable income as a
whole.
51 I.R.C. § 11 (b). The top stated marginal income tax rate for corporations was raised from 34% to
35%, retroactive to January 1, 1993, by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993).
56 The 5% surtax and the additional 3% surtax have the effect of creating a top marginal corporate
tax rate of 43%. However, since the surtaxes are capped, the marginal tax rate for corporate income goes
back down to 35% once the caps have been met. The resulting corporate tax rate structure is: 15%, 25%,
34%, 35%, 40%, 43%, and 35%. CHERYL D. BLOCK, CORPORATE TAXATION: EXAMPLES &
EXPLANATIONS 6 (1998).
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structure is applied to business corporations with stated capital of not more
than 100,000,000 yen. The top marginal rate for business corporations was
reduced several times in the 1990s, from 40%, which was effective from
April 1, 1989 through March 31, 1990, to 30%, which has been effective
since April 1, 1999. 57 In response to these reductions, the effective tax rate
58
on corporate income, including local taxes, has been significantly reduced
from 51.04% (the rate as of April 1, 1989) to 40.87% (the rate as of April 1,
1999). In contrast, in the United States the effective rate has been almost
invariant, remaining at approximately 40-41% during the 1990s.
59
An example helps illustrate the differences between the U.S. and
Japanese tax systems in their treatment of distressed loans. Assume that
both a U.S. bank and a Japanese bank have one million dollars in distressed
loans that qualify for bad debt deductions under the U.S. and Japanese tax
law, in the same fiscal year during the 1980s and 1990s. Also, assume that
all conditions except the effective income tax rate are the same. While the
U.S. bank enjoys a tax benefit resulting from such deductions in the amount
of approximately $400,000, the Japanese bank enjoys a potentially higher
tax benefit in the amount of approximately $400,000 to $500,000.60
57 CTA 1965, supra note 33, art. 66, para. 1. See YOJI GOMI, GUIDE To JAPANESE TAXES 1989-90
16, 173 (1989); YOJI GOMi, GUIDE TO JAPANESE TAXES 1999-2000 18, 165 (1999).
5' "Effective tax rate" is the aggregate tax rate of federal (national) and local (state and city, etc.)
applicable to income earned by the relevant tax-payer, adjusted by the tax effect of the tax deductibility of
certain type of income taxes.
59 As of January 1, 1992, the effective tax rate on corporate income (including state corporate
income tax) in the United States was 40.14%. See TAX BUREAU, THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE OF JAPAN,
ZEISEI SHUYO SANKO SHIRYO-SHO [MAJOR REFERENCE MATERIALS FOR TAX SYSTEM] 82 (1992). As of
January 1, 1998, this effective rate was 40.75%. See Makoto Fujishiro, Heisei JO-nendo Kaisei ni okeru
Hfjin Zeisei Kaikaku no Gaiyd [The Outline of the Reform of Corporation Tax in the 1998 Tax
Amendments], 389 FAINANSU [FINANCE] 78 (1998).
60 A more precise calculation of the scale of tax incentives for the charge-off of a distressed loan
would rely on the use of a bank's "real" effective tax rate (actual taxes paid/pre-tax income), which is
obtained by taking into account tax effects resulting from a variety of individual tax treatments (aimed at
specified policy goals), rather than the "statutory" rate. It has been pointed out that banks in the United
States have been permitted to take deductions that have reduced their "real" effective tax rate significantly
below the "statutory" rate. For example, it was reported that in 1988, such "real" effective tax rate on U.S.
banks was 16.12% compared with 25.92% for all industries. See F. MAROVELLI & B. MOSER, EFFECTIVE
TAX RATES 15 (1990). Another survey reveals that in 1992, the "real" effective tax rate of the top ten
banks in the United States was 29.2%, ranging from a low of -46.7% for Citibank, due to sizable losses, to
a high of 47.2% for Wells Fargo. See SCOTT & IWAHARA, supra note 27, at 63. It was argued that in
Japan, such "real" effective tax rates had been much higher, at least up until the earlier period of the 1990s,
than U.S. counterparts, but so far no detailed figures comparable with the U.S. figures seem to be available.
See Iwahara & Scott IV, supra note 27, at 22. However, some scholars argue that as a result of the fact that
entertainment and social expenses have traditionally been non-deductible for tax purposes in Japan, on
average, the "real" effective tax rate for Japanese corporations might be higher than the "statutory"
effective tax rate as described above. See Hiroshi Kaneko, Hdjinzei Seido no Himonaizishon
[Harmonization *of the Corporate Income Tax Systems], 1000 JURISUTO [JURIST] 97, 98-101 (1992),
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Therefore, at first blush it seems that Japanese banks had at least until in the
middle of the 1990s, the incentive to charge off their distressed loans in a
timely manner in order to enjoy slightly greater tax benefits in the form of a
larger deduction. Of course, the "actual" scale of tax incentives in
connection with non-performing loans cannot be ascertained until the scale
and degree of differences between tax practices in the United States and
Japan, including the stringency of the requirements for allowing bad debt
deductions and the extent to which bad debt losses may be carried forward
or back, are carefully scrutinized.
B. Basic Treatments for Distressed Bank Loans61
1. Under the U.S. Tax System
Since 1987 the U.S. tax system has allowed large62 commercial banks
to deduct bad debt losses only when loans were declared uncollectible under
the direct specific charge-off method of Section 166(a) of the IRC.63 Prior to
1987, the U.S. tax system granted commercial banks an election to deduct
bad debts under either the specific charge-off method or the reserve
method.64 Effective December 31, 1986, the reserve method for computing
and deducting distressed loans was not available to large banking
institutions. 65 Accordingly, large commercial banks could not deduct, any
reserve additions to a loan loss reserve that did not cover the principal of a
specific loan.
Under the specific charge-off method, bad debt deductions are
permitted (1) for debts that become wholly worthless during the taxable year
in question, or (2) for debts that are only partially recoverable, subject to
restrictions set forth in the Treasury Regulations. 66 With respect to a
partially worthless debt, the amount deductible under the specific charge-off
method is restricted to an amount not in excess of the part charged off within
the taxable year. 67 The burden of proof to establish partial or total
reprinted in SHOTOKU KAZEI No HO To SEISAKU [LAW AND POLICY OF INCOME TAXATION] 452, 455
(1996).
61 See generally Yasuhide Yoshida, Beikoku ni okeru Fury5 Saiken Zeimu no Genj: Kin yu Kikan
no Kjsu [Current U.S. Tax Treatments for Distressed Loans: Case Study for Financial Institutions], 463
JICPA JANARU [JICPA JOURNAL] 53 (1994).
62 Banks with gross assets of at least 500 million dollars.
63 See Yoshida, supra note 61.
64 See RONALD W. BLASI, THE BANKING INDUSTRY 412 (1992).
65 See id.
66 I.R.C. § 166(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.166-3 (1998). See also BLASI, supra note 64, at 407.
67 I.R.C. § 166(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.166-3(a)(2) (1998). See also BLASI, supra note 64, at 407.
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worthlessness for obtaining a bad debt deduction rests upon the taxpayer
bank.68
Currently, commercial banks that do not fall within the definition of
"large" banks are still allowed a deduction for a reasonable addition to its
loan loss reserve. This deduction is taken in lieu of any bad debt deduction
under the direct specific charge-off method. The amount of any deductible
reserve addition is calculated under Section 585 of the IRC, using the
experience approach. 69 Thus, under the reserve method, a commercial bank
other than a "large" bank may add to its bad debt reserve the amount called
for on the basis of its actual loan loss experience, as indicated by losses for
the current fiscal year and the preceding five years. 70 The allowable reserve
addition under this approach is equal to the amount needed to increase the
balance of the loan loss reserve for losses on loans at the close of the taxable
year to either (1) the reserve balance determined under a moving-average
approach, or (2) the reserve balance determined by reference to the base year
amount, whichever is greater. 7 '
2. Under the Japanese Tax System
Japan, unlike the United States, permits all banks to use the reserve
method to deduct a specified amount of bad debt expenses for corporate
income tax purposes, in addition to the direct specific charge-off method.72
Japanese tax law recognizes three categories of loan loss reserves: (1) a
general loan loss reserve ("General Reserve"); (2) a special account for loan
depreciation ("Special Depreciation Account"); and (3) a special loan loss
reserve for certain types of foreign loans ("Special Foreign Reserve").73
The Special Depreciation Account 74 is designed to cover specified
individual loans depending on their respective collectibilities. This is
significantly different from the loan loss reserve in the United States. Since
the Special Depreciation Account is used to cover the charge-off of only
actual losses or of specific loans on which losses are highly likely, the
68 See BLASI, supra note 64, at 407.
69 Id. at 420. Thrifts (such as S&Ls) may also use, to some extent, the percentage of taxable income
approach under the reserve method. Id.
70 Id. at 425.
"' I.R.C. §§ 585(b)(2)(A), (B). See also BLASt, supra note 64, 425-26.
72 CTA 1965, supra note 33, art. 52. See also KANEKO, supra note 32, at 286.
73 See SCOT & IWAHARA, supra note 27, at 27.
74 H6jin-zei h6 [Corporation Tax Act], Law No. 34 of 1965, art. 52, para. 1.1 (as amended by Law
No. 24 of 1998) (Japan) [hereinafter CTA 1998]; Hojin-zei h6 sek6 rei, [Corporation Tax Act Enforcement
Cabinet Order] art 96, para. I (as amended by Cabinet Order No. 44 of 1998) (Japan) [hereinafter CTA
Order].
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function of such a Special Depreciation Account, if introduced in the United
States, could substantially overlap with the function of the specific charge-
off method.
Under the Special Foreign Reserve system, banks and thrifts 75 are
entitled to deduct 1% of the total of the net incremental amount of qualified
foreign loans and the balance of rescheduled foreign loans after the base date
for corporate income tax purposes.76
Pursuant to a trend that mirrors the United States' experience, the
maximum amount deductible for corporate income tax purposes under the
General Reserve has consistently been reduced since the establishment of
the system in 1950 by the Shoup Mission Report on Japanese Taxation.7 7
As a result of the 1998 Amendments to the CTA, commercial banks and
thrifts, other than those with stated capital of 100,000,000 yen or less, 78 may
not use the previously permitted flat-rate (0.3%) percentage of eligible loans
approach 79 when calculating the ceiling amount of any deductible reserve
addition to their General Reserve. In using the experience approach, they
will only generally be allowed to add to their General Reserve the amount
required on the basis of their actual experience as indicated by losses for the
previous three fiscal years. In other words, the amount of the General
Reserve deductible for corporate income tax purposes will be the ratio of
average actual loan losses to total loans over the previous three years.
80
In addition to the three types of loan loss reserves mentioned above,
Japanese banks are entitled to compute their bad debt deductions by the
15 Thrifts are federal or state-chartered thrift institutions, which include savings banks and savings
and loan associations. Most of them are regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision, which was
established as an office of the Department of the Treasury on August 9, 1989.
76 Sozei tokubetsu sochi h6 [Special Tax Treatment Law], art. 55-2 (Japan) [hereinafter STTL]. In
the United States, there is a counterpart of this Special Foreign Reserve system in Japan. Under the
Lending Supervision Act of 1983, the U.S. federal banking regulatory agencies require U.S. banks to
establish and maintain special allowances, "Allocated Transfer Risk Reserves ("ATRR")," for country risk
exposures classified by the regulatory agencies as "value impaired." Additions to these provisions are
deductible for U.S. federal income tax purposes. U.S. banks have the option of deducting these losses at
the time of booking those additions to these reserves or electing to recognize the deductible losses when the
losses are eventually realized (e.g., on asset sale). See VIVIEN A. BEATrIE ET AL., BANKS AND BAD DEBTS:
ACCOUNTING FOR LOAN LosSES IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING app. A, 145, 149 (1995).
7 See Toshio Nishino, Furyd Saiken no Shdkyaku to Hikiatekin, Saiken Sh6kyaku Tokubetsu Kanji
[Charge-off of Distressed Loans, as well as Bad Debt Reserve and Special Depreciation Accounts], 28
KOKUSHIKAN HOGAKU 149, 163 (1996).
7 Those "small" banks and thrifts may elect to use the percentage of eligible loans approach
whereby they may deduct reserve additions under the General Reserve system up to 0.3% of their total
loans instead of calculating deductible reserve additions to the General Reserve by using the experience
approach. But if they elect to use this approach, they may not deduct any reserve additions under the
Special Depreciation Account system. See STTL, supra note 76, arts. 57-59.
79 See CTA 1998, supra note 74, art. 52 para. 1.2; CTA Order, supra note 74, art. 96, para. 2.
80 Id.
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direct specific charge-off method under Article 22, Paragraph 3 of the
CTA. 81 Under the specific charge-off method, bad debt deductions are
permitted for debts that become wholly worthless during the taxable year,
subject to their actual charge-off during such taxable year.8 2 Unlike the
United States, since 1980 the Japanese tax authority has taken the position
that partially worthless debt does not entitle a bank to bad debt deductions
under the specific charge-off method, even if the worthless portion is
charged off within the relevant taxable year. 83 According to a recent
judgment of the Supreme Court of Japan,8 4 the burden of proof to establish
total worthlessness of a loan for the purpose of obtaining a bad debt
deduction rests upon the taxpayer bank.
III. MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JAPANESE TAX SYSTEMS
A. Timing of Deductions for Tax Purposes
1. The Different Implications of the "Conformity Rule" Between the
United States and Japan
a. Under the U.S. tax system
The United States provides banks with two conclusive presumptions
of worthlessness when the banks wish to recognize bad debt deductions
under the direct specific charge-off method.8 5 The first is a presumption
allowed under Treasury Regulations since 1936, and the second is the
"conformity election," a presumption incorporated in the Treasury
Regulations in 1991.86 If either of these presumptions applies, debts will be
81 See KANEKO, supra note 32, at 287.
82 See Kokuzeich6 h6jin-zei kihon tsitatsu [Tax Agency Basic Circulars on CTA] 9-6-2 (Japan)
[hereinafter Circular 9-6-2].
83 See KokuzeichO h6jin-zei kihon tsatatsu [Tax Agency Basic Circulars on CTA] 9-6-4 (as amended
by Tax Agency Circular, Choku-h6 2-15, Dec. 25, 1980) (Japan) [hereinafter Circular 9-6-4]; Kokuzeich6
h6jin-zei kihon tsQtatsu [Tax Agency Basic Circulars on CTA], Nin'tei ni yoru saiken sh6kyaku tokubetsu
kanjb ni kansuru uny6-j6 no Rytiten ni tsuite [Notes Concerning Administration of Special Depreciation
Account], Ka-h6 2-4, Sa-ch6 4-4, Sept. 18, 1992 (Japan) [hereinafter Special Depreciation Account]. Both
Circulars were repealed by Kokuzeich6 ts0tatsu [Tax Agency Circulars], Ka-h6 2-7 of 1998, as a result of
the 1998 Amendments to the CTA.
84 Case reprinted in 28 [11] ZEIMU JIREI 65 (Sendai High Ct. Apr. 12, 1996), aff'd, 29(4) ZEIMU
J REi 16 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 22, 1996).
85 See BLASt, supra note 64, 407-08.
6 See Yuri Okina, Nichibei Hikaku kara Mita Kin yll Kikan no Kasidaore Hikiatekin no Atsukai
[Comparative Study on Treatments for Bad Debt Reserve of Financial Institution in the U.S. and Japan],
JAPAN RES. REv., Oct. 1992, at 24, 28.
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conclusively presumed worthless and thus deductible for tax purposes in the
year in which they become worthless.
Under the 1936 presumption set forth in Section 1.166-2(d)(1) of the
Treasury Regulations, a bank loan is presumed worthless when ordered
charged off by a bank regulator and if charged off in accordance with
established regulatory policy and confirmed as such in writing in the next
87
subsequent audit by the bank regulators. Under the conformity election, a
debt that is charged off, in whole or in part, will be presumed to have
become worthless in the taxable year of the charge-off. 88 A debt is
considered charged off if it is pursuant to a specific order of the bank's
federal supervisory authority, or if the debt is classified by the bank as a
"loss asset" under applicable bank regulatory standards. 89 A "loss asset" is a
debt assigned to a class under standards set forth in the "Uniform Agreement
on the Classification of Assets and Securities Held by Banks" or similar
guidance issued by the relevant bank regulator. Relevant bank regulators
include the Office of Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp. ("FDIC"), Federal Reserve Board ("FRB"), Firm Credit
Administration ("FCA"), and the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS").90
Under FDIC Guidelines, examiners may order loans charged off when a
qualifying event occurs, such as foreclosure or the filing of bankruptcy
causing the realization of the loss to be certain. 91 Low-value, high-volume
loans (consumer installment loans, credit card loans, and check credit plans)
are subject to regulated charge-off procedures. 92 For example, consumer
installment paper that is delinquent 120 days or more and credit card and
check credit debt more than 180 days late are considered "loss assets" for
93
regulatory purposes.
In short, in the United States, banks enjoy bad debt deductions for
their distressed loans for tax purposes when those loans are judged as "loss
assets" by regulatory bodies. Some argue that because regulatory bodies tend
to regard distressed loans as "loss assets" more often than the tax authority,
bad debt deductions are more frequently taken by commercial banks and
thrifts.
94
87 SCOTT & IWAHARA, supra note 27, at 29.
88 Treas. Reg. § 1.166-2(d)(3) (1993).
89 See BLASI, supra note 64, at 408.
90 Treas. Reg. § 1.166-2(d)(4)(ii)(C) (1993). See BLASI, supra note 64, at 410.
9' Iwahara & Scott 111, supra note 27, at 17 n.43.
92 id.
93 Id.
94 See Okina, supra note 86, at 29.
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b. Under the Japanese tax system
From 1950 through 1997, Japan adopted a "conformity" rule for bad
debt deductions for tax purposes. 95 Under this rule, which was known as the
"Charge-off Certification System for Distressed Loans," a bank's loss or
reserve addition to the Special Depreciation Account was automatically
deducted for corporate income tax purposes96 if a bank examiner at the
Ministry of Finance ("MOF") issued a certification that a loss had occurred,
or that the requirements for the Special Depreciation Account were met with
respect to certain loan principal held by a bank. Although this rule was
established by the Tax Agency Circular 97 and the MOF Banking Bureau
Release, 98 the tax authority treated it as a prerequisite for the bad debt
deduction, except that a loss was also incurred by the relinquishment of
relevant loan principal based on a plan approved by a bankruptcy court or
rearrangement among the creditors. 99 In this sense, the rule was treated by
the tax authority as a "compulsory" conformity rule for bad debt deductions.
Many commentators argue that the Japanese version of the conformity
rule has contributed to the curbing and delaying of bad debt deductions for
tax purposes. 100Until 1998, both the bank regulator and the tax authority in
Japan had been organizational components of the MOF, resulting in a
conflict of interest.' 0 ' This was quite different from the United States, where
the bank regulatory bodies are separate agencies independent from the tax
authority (the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")) and are not subject to any
"supervision" by the IRS or its supervisory agency, the U.S. Department of
Treasury. 102 Furthermore, until June 1998 the Japanese bank regulatory
body, the Financial Supervisory Agency ("FSA"), was independent from the
MOF, and financial and tax considerations had almost always driven bank
regulatory policy because of the dominance of the Financial Bureau and Tax
95 See, e.g., id. at 26.
96 YOICHI TAKAHASHI, SHINPAN: KEsu SUTADT Ni YORU KIN'YO KIKAN No SAIKEN SHOKYAKU
[NEW EDITION: EXPLANATIONS BASED UPON CASE STUDIES: CHARGE-OFFS BY A FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
OF ITS DISTRESSED LOANS] 10 (2d ed. 1994).
97 Kokuzeich6 h6jin-zei kihon tstitatsu [Tax Agency Basic Circulars on CTA], Kin'y0 kikan no
kasitsukekin no sh6kyaku ni tsuite [Charge-off of Loan Principal Held by Financial Institution], CHOKU-HO
1-42, Jun. 14, 1950 (repealed July 1997).
98 Fury6 saiken no sh6kyaku ni tsuite [Charge-off of Distressed Loan], GIN-GIN No. 310, May 10,
1950 (repealed in July 1997).
99 See TAKAHASHI, supra note 96, at 38.
10o See HORIUCHI, supra note 6, at 171; SCO'T & IWAHARA, supra note 27, at 28; Okina, supra note
86, at 26-27.
101 See Okina, supra note 86, at 27, 29.
'02 See id. at 26-29.
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Bureau over the Banking Bureau in the power-politics within the MOF.1°3
As a result, maximizing the collection of taxes frequently prevailed over the
administrative need to secure the sound operation of banks, thereby reducing
the likelihood of approved bad debt deductions in Japan.' 
04
This reluctance by Japan to allow the prompt charge-off of distressed
bank loans was amplified by the MOF's fear of triggering a financial panic
by disclosing the true financial conditions of troubled financial institutions
to the public. 105 For example, after a MOF special investigation revealed
that sevenjusen companies 10 6 were saddled with approximately 4648 billion
yen of nonperforming loans and other bad debts, several major banks
requested that the MOF allow charge-offs of loans to these companies. The
MOF denied the request. 10 7 In addition, the MOF and tax authority refused
to allow bad debt deductions for the Industrial Bank of Japan and the Long-
Term Credit Bank of Japan with respect to their fiscal year ending on March
31, 1996 after the banks relinquished their distressed loans against their
affiliatedjusen companies. The MOF stated that such deductions would not
be allowed until a special statute for the dissolution ofjusen companies was
enacted and the dissolution agreements were executed in writing. 108 In
November 1995, almost half of the gross assets of the seven jusen
companies,' 0 9 equaling 6410 billion yen in total, had already been officially
classified as "loss assets" by the MOF's special inspections. The fact that
the MOF and tax authority nevertheless refused bad debt deductions for the
above loans against those "living-dead" companies clearly betrayed the
strong and extraordinarily stringent position adopted by the Japanese tax
authority toward the bad debt deduction.
In conclusion, although Japan had maintained a conformity rule
similar to the set of presumption rules adopted by the United States, until
:03 See, e.g., HORIUCHI, supra note 6, at 171; SCOTT & IWAHARA, supra note 27, at 28.
04 Id.
105 See HORIUCHI, supra note 6, at 140-41; Kanaya & Woo, supra note 11, at 26.
106 "Jusen companies" are seven housing loan companies in Japan established principally by banks
and other financial institutions after the 1970s under the supervision of the MOF.
107 See Gink5 Nayamasu "Jikosatei." [ "Self-Assessment" Annoys Banks], NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN,
mominp edition, Aug. 20, 1997, at 7.
See Sh6suke Takeda, Botai-k no Kaijo Jdken-tsuki Saiken H5ki to Kasidaore Sonshitsu ni
Kansuru Saiketsu ni tsuite: Kokuzei Fufuku Shinpansho Hei 9.10.27. Saiketsu no Kent5 [Decision Dealing
With the Issues of Revocable Relinquishment by the Controlling Bank of its Loan Principals to the
Controlled Jusen Housing Loan Company and Resulting Bad Debt Losses. Review of the Decision of The
National Tax Tribunal, dated Oct. 27, 1998], 1510 KIN'Y0 HOMU JuYO 25 (Oct. 27, 1998).
59 At the end of March 1995, the aggregate amount of seven jusen companies' gross assets hit
13,060.4 billion yen. See THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE & THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND
FISHERIES, JOSEN-TO KANKEI SIRYO [REFERENCE MATERIALS BOUND REGARDING JUSEN HOUSING LOAN
COMPANIES, ETC.] 41 (1996).
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July 1997,110 the practical effect on the timing of bad debt deductions was
opposite to that of the U.S. rules. The likely cause of these differences was
the Japanese governmental structure, in which both the bank regulator and
the tax authority were supervised by the MOF, in contrast to the
decentralized governmental structure of the United States. In retrospect, it is
quite obvious that the Japanese version of the conformity rule never offered
any tax incentives to facilitate charge-offs by banks of their distressed loans.
2. General Loan Loss Reserve
a. Under the U.S. tax system
As mentioned above, the United States repealed the general loan loss
reserve ("reserves for bad debts") system under which both "large" banks
and "non-large" banks could deduct certain amounts of reserve additions
irrespective of the occurrence and amount of actual loan losses. This repeal
was driven by the U.S. Congress' desire to move the entire income tax
system closer to a model measuring income based on the Haig-Simons
income model, through a mark-to-market system. Professor Thomas L.
Evans explained the background of this repeal as follows:
Under this reserve method, changes in the reserve balances
generally were accompanied by corresponding changes in
taxable income. An increase in a reserve balance would be
accompanied by an increase in bad debt expense, while a
decrease in a reserve balance would be accompanied by a
decrease in bad debt expense. Arguably, a reserve method,
which reflects declines in the value of a group of assets
(receivables, loans, etc.), more closely approximates a mark-to-
market system in that declines in the value of these assets are
reflected currently, with a corresponding increase in expense to
reflect the diminution in the taxpayer's wealth that has
occurred. Thus, under such a view, the repeal of the reserve
method under the 1986 Act was a step away from mark-to-
market that was undertaken for nothing more than revenue
reasons. However, in the view of the Treasury economists
involved in the initial tax reform proposals that advocated the
repeal of the reserve method, the actual use of the reserve
10 See supra notes 97 and 98 and accompanying text.
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method violated mark-to-market principles by prematurely
reflecting losses that had not yet occurred, and by accounting
for assets (net of reserves) at values that were less than their
true market value. A simple example will explain this theory.
Assume that a commercial bank makes 1000 consumer loans of
$1000 each on December 31, 1989, each bearing a market rate
of interest. Also assume that, the bank, based on past
experience, reasonably believes that it will fail to collect 5
percent, or $50,000, of the total loan balance, although of
course the bank does not know which particular loans will
prove to be uncollectible. On the bank's balance sheet, for its
taxable year ending December 31, 1989, the $1,000,000 cash
expenditure by the bank would be reflected by an increase in its
loans receivable of $1,000,000, simply reflecting the fact that
the bank had converted some of its cash into a different type of
asset, i.e., loans receivable. However, under the reserve
method, the reserve representing estimated uncollectible loans
would also be increased by $50,000 to reflect the bank's
estimate of uncollectible amounts with respect to the new loans.
Similarly, with other factors being held constant, bad debt
expense would be increased by $50,000 to reflect this increase
in the reserve account. This simple example illustrates the
fallacies of the reserve method and the rationale for its ultimate
repeal. Under the reserve method, the portfolio of loans made
on December 31, 1989 for an aggregate amount of $1,000,000
is valued at only $950,000, and the corresponding decline in the
carrying value of the loans is accounted for as an expense.
However, it is unreasonable to assume that the fair market value
of the loan portfolio is less than $1,000,000 on December 31,
1989, because a taxpayer should not be presumed to purchase
an asset (the loan portfolio) for $1,000,000 if on the date of
purchase the portfolio is worth $950,000. The presumption
instead should be that the loan portfolio would be worth its
purchase price of $1,000,000. Thus, the reserve method has
contravened a mark-to-market system by valuing assets at less
than their value, with a corresponding decrease in taxable
income accompanying the undervaluation. Assuming, in the
above example, that $50,000 of the $1,000,000 loaned will
never be collected, one might then inquire as to how the loan
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portfolio is worth $1,000,000, as opposed to $950,000. The
response is, of course, that sufficient interest is charged by the
bank to compensate the bank for the loss of the $50,000
principal with respect to the bad loans. That is, interest that is
charged and collected on the loans that are paid by the debtors
will compensate the bank for the principal (and interest) that the
bank will suffer with respect to the loans that are never
collected. Moreover, banks anticipate that they will suffer
some loan losses from debtor defaults; the interest rate charged
by banks on loans is designed to take these losses into account
and provide the bank's owners with a return on their investment
commensurate with the risk that they are taking by investing
money in the bank. Under this theory, the economic income of
the bank is more accurately determined by allowing the bank a
deduction for loan losses only when specific loans become
worthless, in whole or in part, in future periods. During these
future periods, the bank will also recognize interest income on
its loans that prove to be "good loans," with the risk premium
implicit in this interest income offsetting the deduction for
worthless loans that is taken in the same period. Thus, under
this analysis, Congress moved closer to a mark-to-market
system by repealing the reserve method, in that the reserve
method understated the assets of a taxpayer, while overstating
its expenses, by prematurely recognizing a decline in value that
was economically attributable to a future occurrence. By
allowing only the charge-off method to be used in determining
such losses, the tax base more accurately reflects the economic
situation of the taxpayer by valuing assets in a manner that
more closely approximates their market value."'
Thus, from the viewpoint of income taxation, the repeal of the reserve
method and adoption of the charge-off method would arguably provide a
more accurate account of a taxpayer's economic situation.
b. Under the Japanese tax system
Unlike the U.S. tax system, the Japanese tax system still maintains the
General Reserve system for all banks, even after the 1998 Amendments to
1 Evans, supra note 44, at 840-41 (footnotes omitted).
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the CTA. Commentators have frequently argued that compared to the
United States, Japanese banks enjoy favorable tax treatment in connection
with their distressed loans. They contend this is because of the 1986 U.S.
repeal of reserve method accounting for bad debt deductions. 1 2 Certainly,
Japanese banks have historically enjoyed significant tax benefits under the
General Reserve system. Until 1971, the maximum amount of the general
reserve under the tax law was 1.5% of the aggregate amount of loan assets,
while the average of the Japanese banks' ratios of net loan loss against their
total loan assets from 1956 through 1992 was only 0.06%. Against these
government to bank "hidden subsidies," there was strong criticism from
consumer groups and some politicians that the above General Reserve rate
was higher than the real loan loss rate, and that'the General Reserve was
being used to hide excessive profitability in the banking business." 13 This
matter was especially sensitive in 1970, given the combination of low
regulated deposit interest rates and the high inflation rate resulting from the
oil crisis. Since the cost of deposit interest for banking business and the rate
of lending interests (which is bank income) is determined basically by the
inflation rate, bank profits (derived mostly from the spread between the
lending interest and the deposit interest) constantly increased during this
period. As a result, from 1971 to 1982 the MOF reduced the limitation on
reserve addition deductions for tax purposes under the General Reserve
system for banks from 1.5% to 0.3%.114
It should be noted that the MOF Banking Bureau adopted the same
limit for bank regulatory purposes, even though it regulates bank capital to
protect the safety and soundness of banks, and does not collect taxes.' 5
This is additional evidence that tax considerations drove regulatory policy in
Japan until the FSA became independent from the MOF in 1998.
From 1982 to 1998, the 0.3% limitation on reserve addition
deductions for tax purposes was maintained. Specifically, the General
Reserve could not exceed the higher of 0.3% of total loans or the ratio of
average loan losses to total loans over the previous three years.1" 6 This
provided Japanese banks with some tax benefits derived from the difference
between the 0.3% guaranteed deduction and the bank's actual loan loss ratio
until the fiscal year end on March 31, 1992. Despite this, these tax benefits
have been almost completely eliminated since 1993 because the Japanese
12 See Nishino, supra note 77, at 163; SCOTT& IWAHARA, supra note 27, at 30-31.
113 SCOTT& IWAHARA, supra note 27, at 28.
114 See id.
113 Id.
116 See SCOTT & IWAHARA, supra note 27, at 58 n.34.
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banks' average ratio of net charge-offs 117 to total loans has constantly
exceeded 0.3% since then.
The average ratio of net charge-offs to total Japanese bank' 1 8 loans
was 0.006% from 1956-1992.119 As indicated in Table 1, the ratio of net
charge-offs to the total bank loans of Japanese city banks has steadily
increased with the downturn of the Japanese economy and exceeded the
0.3% threshold in the 1993 fiscal year.
Table 1. Ratio of Net Charge-Offs to Total Bank Loans
120
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Ratio: net charge-offs to total 0.17 0.32 0.34 0.56 1.23 0.46 1.80 1.52
bank loans(%)
The 0.3% guaranteed deduction was repealed by the 1998
Amendments to the CTA. Thereafter, deductible additions to the General
Reserve could not exceed the ratio of average loan losses to total loans in a
three-year period. Accordingly, Japanese banks may theoretically enjoy the
tax benefits that the adoption of the reserve method itself produces by
prematurely recognizing a decline of the value of their loan assets
attributable to a future occurrence. 121
It is uncertain, however, whether Japanese banks are actually earning
any "real" tax benefits under the system. It has repeatedly been pointed out
that Japanese banks, unlike U.S. banks, have long failed to procure sufficient
lending margins containing adequate risk premiums designed to compensate
them for bad debt losses because they have relied too much on the value of
the collateral securing loans. 122 One piece of evidence supporting this
hypothesis is the extremely low average yields on working assets of
Japanese banks as compared to those of banks in other industrialized
countries. In the 1990s, the average yields on working assets of Japanese
117 "Net charge-offs" are defined in this context to include both the amount of charge-offs under the
direct charge-off method and the amount of additions to the Special Depreciation Account.
"8s This includes city banks, regional banks, long-term credit banks, trust banks, and second-tier
regional banks.
119 SCOTT & IWAHARA, supra note 27, at 30.
120 The source of the data is Kin'yfi Zaisei Jijy6, The Bank of Japan.
121 See NAKAZATO, supra note 50, at 72-76.
122 See, e.g., Ote-gin, Rizaya 0.1-0.8% Kakudai: Kigy5 to Kdsh6 e, Shiny5-ryoku ni Oji Kinri-sa
[Money-center banks raises their lending spread by 0.1-0.8%: They are negotiating with borrowers in
order to diversify their loan spreads, depending on the respective borrowers ratings], NIHON KEIZAI
SHINBUN, morning edition, Mar. 21, 1999, at 1.
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banks, together with their returns on assets ("ROA") and returns on equity
("ROE"), were among the lowest among industrialized countries.'23 If the
above hypothesis is true, the maintenance of the reserve method might be
necessary for Japanese banks, in order to measure their "economic income,"
or Haig-Simons income, more accurately for income tax purposes. As Evans
stated,
if... a rate of interest is charged on the loans that is less than
the market rate [which contains a risk premium designed to
compensate the taxpayer for losses resulting from bad loans],
then the interest that is subsequently earned on the loans will
not be sufficient to offset the losses from loans that prove to be
ultimately uncollectible. A reserve method would then more
accurately measure the economic income of the taxpayer. 124
From this perspective, the current General Reserve system might be justified
as a temporary tax measure toward achieving the desired mark-to-market
model.
B. Partial Worthlessness of a Loan
1. Partial Worthlessness of a Loan and Other Issues Regarding the
Timing of Deductions Under Japanese Tax Treatment
a. Special depreciation account and the CCPC
Unlike the IRS, Japan's National Tax Agency ("NTA") has long taken
a very rigid position with respect to the deductibility of a partially worthless
loan, 125 creating impediments for Japanese banks to benefit from possible
bad debt deductions. Unlike the U.S. authority, the NTA has historically
prohibited all taxpayers from using the direct specific charge-off method
with respect to their partially worthless loans. 126 Under Japanese tax
practices, in order to recognize loan loss expenses for tax purposes with
respect to their partially worthless loans, taxpayers must use the Special
Depreciation Account system. This involves the recognition of loan loss
expenses in the amount of the worthless portion of a debt by crediting the
123 See Appendix 1; see also Kanaya & Woo, supra note 11, at 23.
124 Evans, supra note 44, at 841.
125 See, e.g., Kanaya & Woo, supra note 1I, at 11.
126 See Circular 9-6-2, supra note 82.
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amount to the Special Depreciation Account. Until 1992, Japanese
taxpayers were not allowed any bad debt deduction unless they could prove
that more than 50% of the loan in question was unrecoverable, even if there
was no possibility of collecting a lesser portion of the loan.' 27 In addition, in
order for partially worthless loans to qualify for tax deductibility, the NTA
required that the bank debtors demonstrate a negative net worth for a period
of at least two years. 128 These two requirements were great impediments for
Japanese seeking to claim bad debt deductions for partially worthless loans.
In 1992, in response to the surge in the amount of distressed bank
loans resulting from the collapse of the "bubble" economy, the MOF and
NTA started to ease restrictions on distressed loans for financial institutions.
First, they reduced the 50% floor to 40%. Second, they shortened the
required period of the debtors' negative net worth from two years to one
year. As a result, Japanese banks were allowed to recognize loan loss
expenses with respect to a partially worthless loan when it was proved to be
difficult to collect more than 40% of the entire face value of a loan, because
the debtor proved to be insolvent for longer than one year, and the bank had
no expectation of recovery. 129
Such treatments, however, did not seem to provide adequate tax
incentives for banks to timely dispose of their partially worthless loans. One
reason for this was the survival of the floor requirement for tax deductibility.
The U.S. tax system has never imposed such a floor requirement. As a
result, Japanese banks could not realize any tax benefit from partially
worthless loans if the worthless portion did not exceed such threshold (floor)
percentage. In addition, it is difficult to find any justification for the floor
requirement under the Haig-Simons income model.
Another barrier to bad debt deductions was the existence of
burdensome procedural requirements imposed by the NTA in order for
banks to recognize bad debt deductions. Even after the 1992 reform, banks
were required to ascertain the amount of a bad debt deduction, prepare a
liquidation balance sheet reflecting the market value of all assets of the
relevant debtor, and to submit supporting evidence 130 to the NTA. 131
17 See TAKAHASHI, supra note 96, at 120-22.
128 Id.
121 Id. See also Nin'tei-niyoru saiken sh6kyaku tokubetsu kanj6 ni kansuru unyd-j6 no ry0iten ni
tsuite [Concerning Administration of Special Account for Loan Depreciation], Tax Agency, Ka-h6 2-4, Sa-
ch6 4-4, Sept. 18, 1992.
130 Supporting evidence may include including certified appraisal sheets from a real estate appraiser
for each parcel of real estate held not only by such debtor but also by any third party account debtor.
131 See Nin 'tel, Jzfsen wa Kanso ni [Procedural Requirements for Certification of Charge-offs Will Be
Simplified in Case of Jusen Companies], NIKKEI SHINBUN, morning edition, Feb. 21, 1996.
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Clearly, the cost of preparing such materials would be disproportionate to
the corresponding tax benefits with respect to certain small loans.
In an effort to circumvent these problems, in January 1993 Japanese
banks set up the Cooperative Credit Purchasing Company ("CCPC") in
cooperation with the MOF and NTA. 132 The CCPC purchases non-
performing loans from banks and undertakes recovery of these loans. This
achieves the same effect of bad debt deductions because the NTA permitted
banks to recognize the difference between the book value and the sale price
of loans they sell to the CCPC as tax-deductible expenses. 33 Commentators
have stated that this scheme amounted to an accounting sleight of hand
reminiscent of the U.S. Federal Home Loan Bank Board's management of
troubled thrift institutions in the early 1980s. 134 The framework of this
scheme is illustrated as follows:
Suppose a bank had a 100 [yen] loan to a real estate developer
that CCPC determined was worth only 70 [yen]. The bank
would lend CCPC 70 [yen], getting CCPC's note in retum.
CCPC would then use the loan proceeds to buy the loan from
the bank for 70 [yen]. The bank would charge off 30 [yen],
presumably reducing its capital by a like amount, and deduct
the 30 [yen] loss from its taxable income. The net effect would
be that CCPC rather than the developer now owed the bank 70
[yen], and the developer owed CCPC 70 [yen]. If the loan were
really worth 70 [yen], the bank should have been able to sell it
to a third party for that amount. In effect, the validity of the
loan valuations depends on CCPC being able to sell the loans in
the longer term for close to their face amounts; otherwise it will
not be able to pay the banks.'
35
This scheme, however, also has significant problems. First, a bank
must obtain an agreement from the debtor to transfer a target loan to the
CCPC. 136 If the relevant debtor unreasonably refuses to agree to such
transfer, a bank will be unable to get the bad debt deduction. Second, this
132 See Kanaya & Woo, supra note 11, at 11.
133 See id. The National Tax Agency officially confirmed such treatment. Kaitori-gaisha k6s6 ni
taisuru zeimu-j6 no toriatsukai ni tsuite [Tax Treatments for an Idea of the CCPC], National Tax Agency,
Oct. 30, 1992.
134 See Scorr & IWAHARA, supra note 27, at 60 n.47.
135 id.
136 Shtiji Fujimori, Fury5 Saiken Kaitori wo Meguru Mondai-ten [Issues Concerning the Purchase of
Distressed Loans], 479 JICPA JANARu 65-67 (1995).
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scheme applies only to distressed loans secured by real estate mortgages.'
37
Finally, this scheme has the harmful side-effect of delaying the conclusive
disposition of target loans. Since the CCPC's purchase of non-performing
loans is financed by corresponding loans from the selling banks to the
CCPC, this scheme only succeeds in replacing the residual value of a bad
loan with another non-interest bearing loan to the CCPC. Commentators
correctly note that "while the CCPC provides the banks with some tax relief
for their non-performing assets, it does little, if anything, to facilitate the
asset recovery process.' ' 38 If the value of the collateral securing the loan
decreases over the period in which the CCPC holds it, "secondary" losses
will occur with respect to the selling bank.
Given the above, the MOF and NTA eventually eliminated the floor
requirement under the 1998 Amendments to the CTA, !3 9 allowing taxpayers
to enjoy the bad debt deduction for partially worthless loans. By virtue of
this amendment, all taxpayers may deduct the worthless portion of a loan
(regardless of its ratio against the entire loan amount) if the debtor remains
insolvent for at least one year (yielding no expectation of recovery of such
portion). 140 However, the amendment may have come too late. Prior to the
effective date of April 1, 1998, several major Japanese financial institutions
went bankrupt in 1997, including Nissan Life Insurance, Sanyo Securities,
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities.
b. An introduction to the justification of NTA 's policies
To justify its stringent position with respect to the tax deductibility of
a partially worthless loan, the NTA has consistently relied on Article 33,
Paragraph 2 of the CTA. With respect to the recognition rules for corporate
income tax of unrealized losses of certain assets, this provision provides:
Where remarkable damage due to disaster or other facts or
events as prescribed by Cabinet Order has occurred to assets
(excluding deposits, savings, loans, accounts receivable and
other credits) owned by a domestic corporation, and the market
value of the said assets has declined below the book value, and
137 Id.
138 Kanaya & Woo, supra note 11, at 11.
19 See CTA Order, supra note 74, art. 96, para. 2
140 See id.; CENTURY AUDIT CORP., KIN'YO KIKAN NO FURYO SAIKEN SHOKYAKU HIKKEI
[HANDBOOK FOR CHARGE-OFF OF DISTRESSED LOANS BY FINANCIAL INSTITUION] 126, 134-35 (3d ed.
1999). See also Circular 9-6-4, supra note 83; Special Depreciation Account, supra note 83.
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the domestic corporation has reduced the book value by
reckoning into expense for accounting purposes by revaluating
the said assets, out of the portion thus reduced, the amount up
to the balance between the book value of the said assets
immediately before the revaluation and the value of the said
assets at the end of the fiscal year covering the date of the
revaluation shall, in spite of the preceding Paragraph, be
deemed to be the deductible expense in computing the amount
of taxable income in the said fiscal year.14
The NTA has interpreted the exclusion to mean that with respect to
loans and other accounts, not only the recognition of an unrealized loss but
also the recognition of a bad debt loss or a worthless portion thereof for
corporate income tax purposes is prohibited. 142 Under this broad
interpretation, the NTA has traditionally allowed bad debt deduction for tax
purposes only when the entire amount of a loan becomes worthless when
using the direct specific charge-off method. 43 However, the NTA has also
acknowledged that a categorical disallowance of any deductions for tax
purposes with respect to the worthless portion of a loan and other accounts
cannot meet practical needs under actual economic circumstances. 44 To
address this, the NTA created the Special Depreciation Account system in its
rulings. Unfortunately, this was done without enacting or amending any
provisions of tax statutes, and under stringent restrictions, the NTA began to
allow bad debt deductions with respect to certain partially worthless loans in
1954. This system is a "compromise" with reality.1
45
Thereafter, the NTA gradually relaxed the requirements for the bad
debt deduction with respect to partially worthless loans under the Special
Depreciation Account system, but such makeshift measures eventually came
to a dead end during the 1990s. This was due to a significant increase in the
amount of distressed loans held by Japanese financial institutions. As a
result, the MOF and NTA incorporated the Special Depreciation Account
system into tax statutes and relevant regulations by way of the 1998
41 CTA 1965, supra note 33, art. 2, para. 3 (emphasis added).
142 See YOSHIO WATANABE ET AL., SHINPAN: HOJIN-ZEI KIHON TSOTATSU CHIKUJO KAISETSU [NEw
EDITION: COMMENTARY ON EACH PROVISION OF BASIC CIRCULAR ON CORPORATION TAX ACT] 662
(Motoyasu Yoshikawa ed., 1999).
143 See Circular 9-6-2, supra note 82. Exceptionally, however, if a taxpayer creditor relinquishes a
portion of his loan principal, the tax authority will allow bad debt deduction with respect to such
relinquished portion under the specific charge-off method so long as the debtor is insolvent at that moment.
See id.
144 See, e.g., TAKAHASHI, supra note 96, at 105.
"45 See generally Nishino, supra note 77, at 156-58.
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Amendments. 46 However, most of the language of Article 33, Paragraph 2
of the CTA was kept intact.
There are five general categories of arguments justifying Article 33,
Paragraph 2 of the CTA and its stringent treatment with respect to bad debt
deductions for partially worthless loans. 147 The first category of arguments
state that since any loans and accounts receivable are ultimately secured by
the gross assets of the debtor, it cannot be said that any portion thereof
becomes completely worthless until all of the assets of the debtor are
liquidated. 148  This argument has been referred to as the Necessity of the
Liquidation of All Assets of the Debtor Theory ("Necessity of Liquidation
Theory"). The second argument is that tax accounting under the CTA must
be consistent with the accounting methods of the Commercial Code, under
which assets are generally booked at their acquisition costs. 149 The third
argument is that any credits, including deposits, savings, loans and account
receivables are equivalent to money and, as such, it would be improper to
recognize any gains or losses before their realizations.' 50 The fourth type of
justification for this provision is that since there is no "market" for selling
and purchasing loans and other accounts in Japan, it is difficult to assess
their objective exchange value and it would be inappropriate to recognize
any gains or losses based on such uncertain assessment. "' The fifth
argument emphasizes the administrative difficulty in appraising unrealized
losses with respect to loans and other accounts.
152
Among these arguments, the NTA seems to have principally adopted
the first through third arguments as its rationale for this provision and, thus,
for its stringent tax treatments of recognition of bad debt losses with respect
to partially worthless loans.' 53 In particular, the Necessity of Liquidation
Theory seems to constitute the underlying theory upon which the NTA has
based its interpretation of the relevant provisions of tax statutes and
146 CTA 1998, supra note 74, art. 52, para. 1.1; CTA Order, supra note 74, art. 96, para. 1.
147 See generally Hisaya Inouye, Bubun Kashidaore no Ninshiki to Saiken Shdkyaku Tokubetsu Kanj6
[Recognition of Partial Worthlessness of Loan Principal and Special Depreciation Account], 31(3) ZEIRI
46, 48-49 (1988).
148 See, e.g., JIRO YOSHIKUNI, HOJIN-ZEi HO [CORPORATION TAx LAW] 467 (1965).
149 See, e.g., Ichir6 Hara, Hdjin-zei H6 no Zenbun Kaisei ni tsuite [Comprehensive Amendments of the
Corporation Tax Law], 20(7) ZEIKEi TSOSHN 121, 152 (1965).
15o See, e.g., Moriyuki Yamamoto, Fury5 Saiken no Kashidaore Sonshitsu no Zeimu to Ryfliten [Tax
Treatments and Points to Be Noted in Connection with Charge-offs of Distressed Loans], 51(2) ZEIKE!
TS0SHIN 119, 121 (1996).
131 See Sh6suke Takeda, Zeih5 ni okeru Saiken no Sh(5kyaku: Kaish6 Fund Gaku no Kettei ni tsuite
[Charge-offs of Account Receivables Under Tax Laws: Determination of the Amount of the Worthless
Portion], 65(5) KAIKEI 740, at 743, 751-52 (1954).
52 See Inouye, supra note 147, at 49.
113 Id. at 48.
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developed its tax practices with respect to the tax treatments for distressed
bank loans. One good piece of evidence in support of such hypothesis is the
NTA's treatment of secured bad loans. The NTA has long taken the position
that no secured loan is allowed bad debt deduction for tax purposes under
the specific charge-off method until all the relevant collateral is
liquidated. 154 The Supreme Court has implicitly supported this tax
practice.'
55
The NTA's practices with respect to the deductibility of a loan to a
bankrupt debtor provides us with another piece of supporting evidence. The
NTA has traditionally maintained the position that even if a debtor files a
petition for bankruptcy and there seems to be no probability of recovery, a
bad debt deduction will generally not be allowed with respect to a loan under
the specific charge-off method until all assets of the debtor are liquidated
and no more recovery will be made for such loan.' 56 However, such a result
imposes unreasonably harsh burdens on the creditor, especially since it may
frequently take several years to complete the liquidation of a debtor's
assets.157 Therefore, in 1954, the NTA established relief under the Special
Depreciation Account system. The relief provision of this system entitled
taxpayers to deduct 50% of the amount of a loan as reserve additions for tax
purposes, regardless of the actual amount of its worthless portion, when a
debtor has petitioned for bankruptcy, corporate reorganization, composition
of creditors or other types of bankruptcy procedures.
58
The problem with the NTA's reasoning is that none of the five
arguments described above is valid in modem-day Japan. The Necessity of
Liquidation Theory is a derivative of the realization doctrine, which
supplements the Haig-Simons income model.159 The realization requirement
is justified on the grounds that periodic taxation of accrued but unrealized
gains (and losses) would cause three problems that, "taken together, appear
insurmountable" from the point-of-view of the tax administration agency:
"(1) the administrative burden of annual reporting; (2) the difficulty and cost
of determining asset values annually; and (3) the potential hardship of
"54 See Circular 9-6-2, supra note 82.
155 Case reprinted in 198 ZEIMU SOSHO SIRYO 1213 (Nagoya High Ct. Sept. 30, 1993), aff'd, 206
ZEIMU SOSHO SuYO 57 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 25, 1994).
156 See Ichiro Hara, Kashidaore Sonshitsu [Bad Debt Loss], 42 JOURNAL OF JAPAN TAX RES. INST.
215, 226-27 (1999).
157 In case of a bankruptcy proceeding, it is pointed out that sometimes it takes more than ten years to
complete the liquidation of a debtor's assets. See In re Sueno K6san Co., Ltd., reprinted in 1040 KtN'Y0
SHOJI HANREi 3 (Osaka Dist. Ct. Mar. 31, 1998).
158 CTA 1998, supra note 74, art. 52, para. 1.1; CTA Order, supra note 74, art. 96, para. 1. See also
KokuzeichO hojin-zei kihon tsatatsu [Tax Agency Basic Circulars on CTA] 9-6-4 to 9-6-11.
159 See Evans, supra note 44, at 825.
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obtaining the funds to pay taxes on accrued but unrealized gains.' 60 None
of these justifications is applicable to the issue of bad debt deduction under
tax laws. Since the bad debt deduction is allowed only when the financial
condition of the debtor becomes essentially irrecoverable, both the burden of
annual reporting and the difficulty and cost of annual assessment of asset
values render the deduction meaningless. Moreover, since bad debt
deduction provides only a benefit to the taxpayer, the potential hardship of
obtaining funds to pay taxes renders the provision inadequate. Accordingly,
applying the realization doctrine to the area of bad debt deduction
contradicts the premise behind the Haig-Simons income model. Needless to
say, the Necessity of Liquidation Theory is inconsistent with a mark-to-
market tax accounting system.
The remaining arguments justifying the NTA's stringent position on
the deductibility of partially worthless loans also prove unpersuasive. The
second argument has been obsolete since 1999. This argument states that
tax accounting under the CTA must be consistent with the accounting
methods of the Commercial Code under which assets are generally booked
at their acquisition costs. In 1999, the Commercial Code of Japan was
amended to permit the booking of marketable accounts (including
commercial paper and negotiable time certificates of deposit) at their market
values rather than their face values.' 61 The third argument is also obsolete.
It argues that credits are equivalent to money and, as such, it would be
improper to recognize any gains or losses before their realization. But, it is
impossible to assume loans and other accounts are the equivalent of money
in the present high-risk economy. Finally, both the fourth and fifth
arguments have become obsolete. These arguments state that no market
exists for loans and other accounts in Japan to create an objective exchange
value, and that it would be administratively difficult to appraise unrealized
losses with respect to loans and other accounts. But in actuality, the late
1990s saw the emergence and development in Japan of markets for loans
and other accounts. 162 In short, Article 33, Paragraph 2 of the CTA lost all
of its rationale by the late 1990s, and maintaining the provision is
inconsistent with the Haig-Simons income model. As compared to the U.S.
160 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS FOR TAX REFORM 82-83 (1977). See also GRAETZ &
SCHENK, supra note 41, at 160.
161 See Sh6 h6 [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 (adopted Mar. 9, 1899), art. 285-4, para. 3 (as added
by Law No. 125 of 1999) (Japan) [hereinafter Commercial Code].
162 See generally OSHIMA & NISHtMURA, supra note 24, at 25-27, 29-33.
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tax system, Japan's tax policy provides unreasonable restrictions on bad debt
deductions. 1
63
c. Influences and impact of the Necessity of Liquidation theory on
Japanese tax treatments for distressed loans
The Necessity of Liquidation theory exerts significant influence on
almost all tax treatments for distressed loans in Japan. For example, the
Japanese tax authority seems to be extremely reluctant to allow bad debt
deduction for a junior secured loan until all assets of the debtor are actually
liquidated, even if the market value of those assets is clearly insufficient to
cover even the senior secured loans owed by such debtor. 64 Further, the tax
authority is very reluctant to allow bad debt deduction for a non-secured
loan until all assets of the debtor are actually liquidated, even if the market
value of those assets is clearly insufficient to cover the secured loans owed
by such debtor.' 65 Additionally, the Japanese tax authority is reluctant to
allow tax deductions for subordinated loans until all assets of the debtor are
liquidated and their market value is realized, even if it is obvious that the
market value of the debtor's gross assets is below the face amount of senior
non-secured loans owed by the debtor.' 66 As a result, when real estate prices
were continuously falling and the market for real estate mortgages became
poor in the 1990s, a Japanese bank could not recognize a bad debt deduction
with respect to more than 50% of the amount of its loan principal for several
years, even if the debtor had already gone bankrupt and it was obvious that
the market value of the debtor's entire assets was far from sufficient to cover
all of the loans held by its senior lenders.
163 See Yoshinobu Shinagawa, Fukumi-eki, Fukumi-zon ni Kansuru H5jin-zei no Kadai [Open Issues
on Corporate Income Tax in Connection with Unrealized Gain and Loss], 54 ZEIKEI Ts0SHIN 17, 21
(1999).
'64 See Circular 9-6-2, supra note 82. See also TAKAHASHI, supra note 96, at 101 n.7.
165 See K.K. Nihon K6gy6 Gink6 v. T6kya Kokuzeikyoku-cho, 1510 KIN'Yu HOMu JuO 36, 40 (Nat'l
Tax Trib., Oct. 27, 1998); Sensui Hajime, Tanpo Bukken Shobun Mae ni Bubun-teki Kasidaore ga
Mitomerareta Jirei [A Case Precedent That Approved the Tax Deductibility of Partial Worthless Loan
Prior to the Liquidation of Collateral Held by the Debtor], 38(9) ZEiKEI TSOSHIN 217, 222-23 (1983).
166 See K.K.Nihon K6gy6 Gink6, supra note 165, at 40. See also Takeda, supra note 108, at 30-34.
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2. Partial Worthlessness of a Loan and Other Issues Regarding the
Timing of Deductions Under US. Tax Policy
a. Tax treatments for partial worthlessness of a loan in the United States
Unlike the tax treatments in Japan that existed up until 1998, U.S. tax
law permits a deduction for partially worthless debts. This deduction is
permitted on the condition that the taxpayer charges off an appropriate
amount and the IRS is satisfied that the debt is "recoverable only in part.',
167
While a deduction for a wholly worthless loan does not require any action by
the taxpayer (other than claiming the deduction on the return or in a claim
for refund) and must be taken in the year in which the debt "becomes
worthless," a deduction for a partially worthless loan requires an election by
the taxpayer and is conditioned on a charge-off 168 of the uncollectible
amount on the taxpayer's records. 169 The IRS' discretion regarding a
deduction for partial worthlessness must be exercised reasonably. If a
taxpayer challenges the IRS' denial of a deduction for a partially worthless
loan, the taxpayer's burden of proof is heavier than in the case of a
completely worthless loan, because the court looks at whether or not the IRS
abused its discretion in denying the deduction rather than at whether the debt
was actually partially worthless.
170
If a debt is actually collected in part, the unpaid balance may be
deducted for tax purposes when it becomes worthless (which may be in the
year of the partial payment or later), if and to the extent that the taxpayer's
basis for the debt exceeds such partial payment.' 7 1 If the taxpayer accepts
167 I.R.C. § 166(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.166-3 (1998).
168 I.R.C. § 166(a)(2). The U.S. Tax Court has held, however, that the creation of a specific bad-debt
reserve to cover the known amount of worthlessness of a specific loan is the equivalent of a "charge-off."
Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Comm'r, 34 TC 416 (1960), acq., 1960-2 C.B. 4.
1 9 See Treas. Reg. §1.166-3(a) (1998); BirrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 53, at 33-14. See also Int'l
Proprietaries, Inc. v. Comm'r, 18 T.C. 133 (1952) (charge-off requirement not satisfied); Brandtjen &
Kluge, Inc. v. Comm'r, 34 T.C. 416, 440-44 (1960), acq., 1960-2 C.B. 4 (effective charge-off found). See
also Nat'l Bronx Bank of NY v. Comm'r, 147 F.2d 651 (2d Cir. 1945) (basis of debts reduced on partial
charge-off even if deduction produces no tax benefit); Rio Grande Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.
657, 664 (1961) acq., 1962-1 C.B. (charge-off after close of taxable year, during period required to close
books, suffices); Findley v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 311, 318 (1955), afd per curiam, 236 F.2d 959 (3d Cir.
1956) (partial charge-off and deduction permitted in year partial worthlessness is discovered or in a later
year when debt becomes wholly worthless).
170 See BrrTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 53, at 33-14. See also Brimberry v. Comm'r, 588 F.2d 975
(5th Cir. 1979) (disallowance upheld), and cases cited therein; Austin Co. v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 955 (1979)
(abuse of discretion found); Prod. Steel, Inc. v. Comm'r, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 77, 81 (1979) (although "wise
exercise of business judgment supported by all of the facts available" would establish abuse of discretion
by IRS, this was not shown by facts before court).
171 I.R.C. § 166(a)(2). See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 53, at 33-11.
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less than the full amount of the debt and cancels the balance, there is no
remaining debt to be deducted as bad debt losses under Section 166 of the
IRC. The canceled amount may only be deductible as a general loss under
Section 165, which is subject to restrictions. 172 An exception to this
principle may be made, however, if the cancellation is just a formality
because the creditor's claim for the balance is clearly worthless.
73
b. The inapplicability of the Necessity of Liquidation theory under U.S.
tax law and practices
Given that the worthless portion of a loan has traditionally been
entitled to the bad debt deduction without any substantial limitations, this
suggests that the Necessity of Liquidation Theory is inapplicable to the
United States' tax law and practices. The tax treatments applied to the loan
of a bankrupt debtor provide us with some evidence of this inapplicability.
Section 1.166-2(c) of the Treasury Regulations explicitly states that
bankruptcy "is generally an indication of the worthlessness of at least a part
of an unsecured and unpreferred debt" and "[i]n bankruptcy cases a debt
may become worthless before settlement in some instances; and in others,
only when a settlement in bankruptcy has been reached." 174 These
provisions indicate that a settlement in bankruptcy (i.e., the liquidation of all
assets of the debtor and distribution of money from such liquidation) is
generally not required by the U.S. tax authority as a prerequisite for a bad
debt deduction. In addition, commentators have argued that "in many cases,
a debt may become worthless before a bankruptcy settlement has been
reached."'175 It is also notable that Treasury Regulations do not require legal
action to be taken before a bad debt deduction is allowable, when the
surrounding circumstances indicate that a debt is worthless and uncollectible
172 See BITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 53, at 33-11. See also First Nat'l Bank of Durant v. Comm'r,
6 B.T.A. 545 (1927) (third party posted security for part of debt owed to taxpayer, who cancelled balance
as uncollectible; held, loss rather than bad debt); Thorman v. Comm'r, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 653 (1949) (loss
rather than bad debt where taxpayer accepted part payment in full settlement). But see Rev. Rul. 68-523,
1968-2 C.B. 82 (creditor accepted property in complete satisfaction of debtor's liability; bad debt deduction
allowed if property's value is less than unpaid balance; no mention of Thorman case).173 See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 53, at 33-11. See also Brown v. Comm'r, 10 B.T.A. 1036,
1045 (1928) (on receiving part payment, taxpayer agreed to cancel balance, which was in fact uncollectible;
held, subsequent release pursuant to agreement does not bar deduction of unpaid balance as worthless
debt).
'74 Treas. Reg. § 1.166-2(c) (1993) (emphasis added).
75 LANCE W. ROOK & STANLEY I. LANGBEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF BANKS AND
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 6-4 (6th ed. 1999).
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and that legal action to enforce payment would in all probability not result in
the satisfaction of execution on a judgment.176
A Technical Advice Memorandum issued by the IRS in 1995
("Memorandum") 177 illustrates the substantial differences between United
States bad debt deduction timing policy and that of Japan. The
Memorandum discusses whether the Necessity of Liquidation Theory is
considered an appropriate rationale for the timing of distressed loan
deductions. The Memorandum hypothetically considers the tax deductibility
of a subordinate debenture issued by a subsidiary and held by a parent bank.
The taxpayer bank had subordinated debentures issued by its Subsidiary,
which was incorporated in Country A. The debentures were subordinate to
the claims of all of the Subsidiary's general creditors. In year "X-l," the
banking authority of Country A determined that the subsidiary required
additional loan loss provisions in order to continue in operation. As the
amount of the additional loan loss provisions mandated was in excess of the
value of the subsidiary's capital funds, the taxpayer concluded that the
Subsidiary should cease operations. Later that year, the taxpayer bank's
board of directors passed a corporate resolution committing the bank to
recognizing that, among other things, the interests of the taxpayer would best
be served by the Subsidiary's fully satisfying the claims of its non-
shareholder depositors and creditors, in the course of implementing a
"members' voluntary winding up" for the liquidation of the Subsidiary.
The taxpayer asserted that because of the significant commonalities
between the customers of the taxpayer and of the subsidiary, the taxpayer
would have suffered substantial damage to its goodwill and reputation
within the international banking community had the Subsidiary been
permitted to fail without its creditors having been satisfied in full. The
resolution authorized the taxpayer's officers, among other things, to (i)
terminate the Subsidiary's business, and wind up and liquidate the
Subsidiary expeditiously, (ii) accept assets of the Subsidiary in full
liquidation of the taxpayer's investment in the Subsidiary, (iii) account for
the assets received from the Subsidiary when received by the taxpayer at
such values as may be prudent, and (vi) recognize as a loss that amount by
which the assets accepted in liquidation of the investment in the Subsidiary
exceeds the taxpayer's basis in the Subsidiary.
In year "X-1," the taxpayer notified the banking authority of Country
A that the company intended to wind up the affairs of the subsidiary, in the
176 Treas. Reg. § 1.166-2(b) (1993).
177 Tech. Adv. Mer. 95-22-003 (Jun. 2, 1995).
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process providing the support required by the subsidiary to meet its financial
obligations in full. The Taxpayer then did so and actually supplied funds to
repay the subsidiary's obligations to its non-shareholder creditors.
Subsequently, the Taxpayer entered into a formal liquidation agreement with
the subsidiary, shareholder B, and the subsidiary's liquidating trustee. The
liquidation agreement provided that for the purpose of restoring the
subsidiary to nominal solvency so as to permit the liquidation to proceed as a
voluntary winding up, the shareholders agreed to release and discharge all of
the subordinated debentures and all moneys secured thereby, and to waive
all claims they had as creditors of the subsidiary (to the extent necessary to
ensure that the subsidiary would be solvent and fully able to discharge its
non-shareholder liabilities). The subsidiary concurrently filed
documentation with banking officials asserting its solvency for purposes of
pursuing a members' voluntary winding up. The documents stated that as of
such moment the subsidiary's total estimated deficiency equaled the amount
that would be funded through the cancellation of the subordinated
debentures, the waiver of the stand-by credits, and the waiver of interest
bearing loans.
Based on the above findings of fact, the Memorandum noted that the
taxpayer's cancellation of the subordinated debentures did not constitute a
capital contribution to the subsidiary:
The facts and circumstances surrounding the instant transaction
indicate that the subordinate debentures became worthless in
year [X-l]. By the terms of the debenture agreement, the
debentures were subordinate to the claims of all of [the
subsidiary's] general creditors. At the end of year [X-l], the
Taxpayer determined that [the subsidiary] was unable to satisfy
the debts owed to its non-shareholder creditors, and that the
subsidiary no longer constituted a viable economic entity. The
Taxpayer's decision in year [X-l], to infuse sufficient funds
into the subsidiary to permit satisfaction of [the subsidiary's]
nonshareholder debts and to terminate [the subsidiary's]
operations is testimony to the Taxpayer's determination that as
of the end of year [X-l], [the subsidiary] was not capable of
paying its obligations from current or future revenues or from
its available assets.
The test applicable in determining whether a debt has become
worthless for purposes of Section 166 is an objective one. A
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person knowledgeable of the banking industry reasonably
would have concluded, as did the Taxpayer, that collection of
the amounts owed by [the subsidiary] under the terms of the
subordinated debentures became hopeless in year [X-1].
Accordingly, even though the taxpayer did not formally
discharge the subordinated debentures off of its book until year
[X-2], the subordinated debentures became worthless in year
[X-l], and should be deducted under section 166 of the Code in
that year. 17
8
Under this analysis, the IRS recognized the complete worthlessness of
the subordinated debentures in the same year that the banking authority of
Country A recognized the insolvency of the subsidiary. In other words, the
IRS did not require a "one-year waiting period." This one-year waiting
period is required by the Japanese tax authority for the tax deductibility of
partially worthless debt in order to recognize the tax deductibility of the
"entire" amount of those subordinated debentures. 179 In addition, bad debt
deductions were allowed for tax purposes prior to the year in which the
parties entered into a formal liquidation agreement, and prior to the
taxpayer's subsequent release and discharge of its subordinated debentures
against the subsidiary. This indicates that, for the IRS, the Necessity of
Liquidation theory is not influential in deciding whether a bad debt
deduction should be allowed. Instead, this decision provides proof that
United States tax authority recognizes the "Reasonable Business Judgment"
theory, under which bad debt deduction for tax purposes may be allowed
when "a person knowledgeable of the relevant industry" reasonably would
conclude that collection of the amounts owed by the debtor has become
hopeless.' 80
The case of American Offshore, Inc. v. Comm'r, 181 also offers
evidence that the IRS remains unconvinced by the Necessity of Liquidation
theory. In this case, the central issue was whether a subordinated note
secured by second preferred fleet mortgages became completely worthless
on February 28, 1983 and thus entitled the taxpayers to the bad debt
deduction in 1983. The debtor in this case was engaging in the business of
178 Id.
179 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
S0 For an example of a case that clearly adopted this standard, see Riss v. Comm'r, 478 F.2d 1160
(8th Cir. 1973); Raffold Process Corp. v. Comm'r, 153 F.2d 168 (1st Cir. 1946); Deeds v. Comm'r, 47 F.2d
695 (6th Cir. 1931).1SI American Offshore, Inc. v. Comm'r, 97 T.C. 579 (1991).
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operating workboats and offshore oil rig supply services. The taxpayer
creditors held an $11 million subordinated note issued by the debtor, which
was principally secured by second preferred fleet mortgages issued on
twelve vessels by the debtor. A steep decline and deterioration of the
offshore service industry resulted in it appearing unlikely that even the
payments to the senior creditor bank could be made as required. As of
February 28, the fair market value of the twelve vessels, which were the only
major assets securing the subordinated note at that time, was $9 million.
This amount was inadequate to pay the more than $15 million owed by the
debtor to the senior creditor bank and secured by the first fleet mortgage on
the same twelve vessels. No payments were due as of February 28, 1983
with respect to the subordinated note; the first payment under the note was
not expected until 1985 under optimum conditions.
Based on these findings of fact, the U.S. Tax Court concluded that the
loan was worthless before actual liquidation of collateral:
Worthlessness is determined by objective standards. Some
factors that have been considered by courts in determining
worthlessness include the subordinated status of the debt; a
decline in the debtor's business; the decline in value of the
property secured by the debt; claims of prior creditors far in
excess of the fair market value of all assets available for
payment; the overall business climate; the debtor's earning
capacity; the debtor's serious financial reverses; guarantees on
the debt; events of default, whether major or minor; insolvency
of the debtor; the obligor's refusal to pay; abandonment of
assets or business; ill health, death, or disappearance of the
principals; bankruptcy or receivership; actions of the obligee in
pursuing collection, i.e., whether the obligee unreasonably
failed to take collection action and then claimed the deduction;
subsequent dealings between the obligee and obligor; and lack
of assets. No single factor is conclusive as there are no
absolutes in this area. Default is a factor considered in deciding
whether an obligation is worthless. The first payment under the
note was not expected until 1985 under optimum conditions.
No payments were due as of February 28, 1983. However, the
fact that a debt had not matured does not prevent a finding of
worthlessness. Similarly, the fact that a bad debt is not due at
the time of deduction does not of itself prevent its allowance
under Section 166. Sec. 1.166-1(c), Income Tax Regs. A
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taxpayer need not wait for a default before taking a bad debt
deduction if the debt is clearly worthless before any payments
are due. Applying these factors to this case we conclude that as
of February 28, 1983, there were reasonable grounds for
abandoning any hope of repayment of the $11 million
subordinated note. We also conclude that the collapse of the
offshore oil rig supply industry leading to the loss in value of
the vessels is a sufficiently identifiable set of circumstances to
explain the worthlessness of the subordinated note.
82
As the court held that bad debt deduction is allowed before the actual
liquidation of the collateral, this case indicates that the Necessity of
Liquidation theory has not been adopted by the United States. Further, this
case is clear evidence that the "subordinated status of the debt" is, under
U.S. tax policy, a factor used to determine "worthlessness" in connection
with a bad debt deduction.183 This treatment is diametrically opposed to
Japan's tax policy, which rarely allows deductions for subordinated debt
until all assets of the debtor are liquidated. This is true even if it is clear that
the market value of the debtor's gross assets is far below the aggregate
amount of face values of senior loans owed by the debtor. 
184
In essence, the United States employs the "Reasonable Business
Judgment" rule instead of the "Necessity of Liquidation" theory in
determining whether or not a certain distressed loan has become worthless.
As a result, in the United States, a holder of a distressed loan seems entitled
to claim the bad debt deduction earlier than in Japan.
C. Adoption of the "Deferred Tax Assets" Concept in Accounting
There are significant timing differences between U.S. and Japanese
accounting and taxation treatments of expenses, including bad debt
expenses. 185 These differences are quite apparent in those countries where
..2 Id. at 594-96 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
' The factors tending to refute the presumption that a debt is worthless include: the creditor's failure
to press for payment (especially if the debtor is a relative or friend), willingness to make further advances,
availability of collateral or guarantees by third parties, the debtor's earning capacity, minor defaults,
payment of interest, and sluggish business conditions. See Riss, 478 F.2d at 1160 (further advances);
Comm'r v. Transport Mfg. & Equip. Co., 478 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1973) (debtor remained going concern);
BRH Builders, Inc. v. U.S., 620 F. Supp. 7 (C.D. Ill. 1985) (continued pursuit of claim and later
settlement); Record Wide Distribs., Inc. v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 704 (1981), aff'd, 682 F.2d 204 (8th
Cir. 1982) (taxpayer continued to do business on cash basis with debtor).
184 See supra Part III.B. 1.c.
'" See BEATIrE ET AL., supra note 76, at 30.
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the "conformity rule" has not been adopted in determining the tax
deductibility of bad debt losses, as was the case in Japan after 1997.186 This
fact, however, does not seem to be clear at first in those countries where the
"conformity rule" is used in determining the tax deductibility of bad debt
losses, as is the case in the United States currently187 and in Japan before
1997.
The common characteristic of all timing differences is that the period
in which a transaction is recognized for accounting purposes differs from the
recognition period for tax purposes. Under the "conformity rule," when the
bank regulator acknowledges that a debt should be classified as a "loss
asset," the amount of the debt is allowed as a deduction. However, the
"conformity rule," which has been adopted in the United States and was
recognized in Japan until 1997, covers only a debt that is classified as a
"loss," and not those classified as "substandard" or "doubtful."' 88 In both
the United States and Japan, banks have been required by bank regulators to
establish a loan loss provision covering at least a portion of such loan for
accounting purposes, but the amount covered by such provision is not
automatically recognized as "bad debt loss," even under the "conformity
rule." Thus, timing differences between accounting for bad debt expenses
and bad debt expense deductions have occurred, even under the conformity
rule. This timing difference works in the opposite direction when the debt is
actually charged off or otherwise deducted for tax purposes.
In order to eliminate or otherwise minimize the impact of these timing
differences on reported cash flow, earnings, and capital for accounting
purposes, a deferred tax asset or liability has historically been recognized in
an enterprise's financial statements under U.S. generally accepted
accounting principles ("U.S. GAAP"). 189 These rules of recognition of a
deferred tax asset (or liability) affect the impact of the loan loss provisions
on earnings and capital of banks and thrifts.1 90 Suppose, for example, that a
bank made a general loan loss provision of 1/ at the end of its first fiscal
year. Suppose further that a general loan loss provision will be used in the
next fiscal year to charge-off bad loans against which no specific loan loss
provision has been made, and that a new general loss provision, 12, will be
established. Under the tax regime in which corporate income tax is charged
186 See supra Part Il.A.l.b.
187 See supra Part lll.A.1.a.
181 See supra Part III.A.I.
1' Under Opinion No. 11 of the Accounting Principles Board, which was published in December
1967, deferred tax assets (and liabilities) are recognized for accounting purposes.
'90 See BEATrIE ET AL., supra note 76, at 31.
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at a rate t and general provisions are not deductible in determining taxable
profits, the effect of the general provision on reported earnings for the first
fiscal year, and on capital at the end of the same year, depends on how
deferred tax is accounted for. In other words:
(1) if the accounting rules do not provide for the recognition of
deferred tax assets, reported earnings and capital will be
reduced by 11; and
(2) if the accounting rules provide for the recognition of deferred
tax assets calculated using the "comprehensive" allocation
method,' 91 in which the full value of the provision is used in
determining the size of the deferred tax asset, reported earnings
and capital will be reduced by 11 (1 - t). 192
As a result of the fact that a deferred tax asset is recognized in the
balance sheet, earnings and capital are reduced only by the post-tax cost of
the provision, whereas if a deferred tax asset is not recognized in the balance
sheet, earnings and capital are reduced by the full cost of the provision.
93
The United States has not recognized tax deductions for specific or general
loan loss provisions since 1986.194 Thus, U.S. banks have been cushioned
against the full impact of loan loss provisions on their earnings and capital.
Realization of a deferred tax asset depends on the reversal of the loss
provision and the ability to reduce the tax by the amount of the deferred tax
asset, or obtain a refund. This depends on either the existence of taxable
income in the year of reversal or the taxpayer's capacity to utilize all
deductible losses against taxable income in fiscal years prior to the
reversal. 195 In the United States, strict assurance that a deferred tax asset
will be realized is not required to recognize such asset. Instead, a valuation
adjustment must be made if it is "more likely than not" that future tax
191 The other possible method is the "partial" provision method, which only allows for the recognition
of the element of a provision that, when it reverses, will not be replaced by a new provision. See BEATTIE
ET AL., supra note 76, at 30. Both the U.S. and Japanese rules for the recognition of deferred tax assets
adopt the "comprehensive" provision method. See Masao Yanaga, Zei K6ka Kaikei no Riron-teki Haikei to
Mondai-ten [Theoretical Backgrounds and Problems of the Accounting Method Acknowledging Deferred
Tax Assets], 1522 SHOJI HOMU 14, 16 (1999). SATOSHI DAIGO ET AL., KOKUSAI KAIKEI KUUN To NIHON
No KIGYO KAIKEI [INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND CORPORATE ACCOUNTINGS IN JAPAN]
52 (Satoshi Daigo ed., 1999).
92 See BEATTIE ET AL., supra note 76, at 31.
193 See id.
:94 See supra Part III.A.2.a.
9' See id.
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benefits will be lost, i.e., some portion or all of the deferred tax asset will not
be realized. 1
96
There are basically two methods of measuring the amount of a
deferred tax asset or liability: the "deferral" method and the "liability"
method.' 97 These two methods differ principally in the effective tax rate
used to measure a deferred tax asset or liability. The deferral method uses
the effective tax rate in force when the timing difference originates, whereas
the liability method uses the effective tax rate expected when the timing
difference reverses.198  Prior to 1987, the U.S. GAAP used the deferral
method. In 1987, the Financial Accounting Standards Board switched to the
liability method by issuing Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
96, entitled "Accounting for Income Taxes" ("SFAS 96"), which was
effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1988.199
In contrast to the United States, the generally accepted accounting
principles in Japan ("Japanese GAAP") did not recognize a deferred tax
asset or liability until 1999, except in relation to consolidated financial
statements.2 °° Under the new ordinances of the MOF and the Ministry of
Justice, Japanese companies may recognize deferred tax assets in their
unconsolidated financial statements for fiscal years ending on or after
January 1, 1999 and they must recognize deferred tax assets and liabilities
for fiscal years beginning on or after April 1, 1999.201
Many commentators have argued that this non-recognition of deferred
tax assets in unconsolidated financial statements under the Japanese GAAP
likely affected the choice of timing by Japanese banks for setting up the
1- See BEA-17EE ET AL., supra note 76, at 149 app. A.
197 See id. at 31.
198 See id.
199 SFAS 96 was superseded by SFAS 109, Accounting for Income Taxes, which has been effective
for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1992.
2o See SATOSHI DAIGO ET AL., supra note 191, at 49-50. By 1997, the following countries
recognized a deferred tax asset even in unconsolidated financial statements: the United States, the United
Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain, Denmark, Ireland, Italy,
Norway, Iceland, South Africa, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Fiji,
Hong Kong, Kenya, South Korea, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan,
Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Bermuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Jordan, Mauritius. See MASAO
YANAGA & HIROSHI ASHIDA, ZEI KOKA KAIKEI [ACCOUNTNG METHOD ACKNOWLEDGING DEFERRED TAX
ASSETS] 211-13 (1997).
20' Kabushiki kaisha no taishaku taish6-hy6, son'eki keisan-sho, eigy6 h6koku-sho oyobi fuzoku
meisaisho ni kansuru kisoku [Regulations Concerning Balance Sheet, Profit and Loss Statement, Business
Report and Incidental Schedules], arts. 13-2, 19-2, 29-2, 30-2, 33-2, 43 (newly introduced by the Ordinance
of the Ministry of Justice No. 53 of 1998) (Japan); Zaimu shohya-t6 no y6go, yoshiki oyobi sakusei-h6h6
ni kansuru kisoku [Regulations Concerning the Terms, Format, Method of Preparation of Financial
Statements, etc.], arts. 8-11, 8-12, 16-2, 17, 31-3, 32, 48-2, 49, 51-2, 52, 54, 54-2, 95-5, 98-2 (newly
introduced or amended by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Finance No. 173 of 1998) (Japan).
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necessary loan loss provisions for their distressed loans in the 1990s. 20 2 The
management of Japanese banks has traditionally been inclined to focus on
reported earnings in their financial statements on an unconsolidated basis for
two reasons. First, the bank's capacity to pay dividends has been limited by
the amount of reported earning under the Commercial Code of Japan.20 3
Second, this action is significant because it has been widely believed in
Japan that a decline in reported earnings on an unconsolidated basis and
suspension or decrease of dividend payments would be a signal of distress
and lead to a sharp fall in bank stock prices or possibly even to a run on
204banks. Furthermore, guidelines issued by the stock exchanges in Japan
require any listed corporations to be taken off the exchange if they incur
negative income on an unconsolidated basis for three consecutive years.
Therefore, Japanese banks have had a strong motivation to omit negative
income from their financial statements on an unconsolidated basis.
20 5
The following facts demonstrate the strong influences of those two
factors on a bank's decision with respect to the level of additional loan loss
provisioning in a fiscal year. 20 6  In 1995, Japanese banks incurred a
combined loss of five trillion yen. In 1996, they tried to avoid reporting
these losses, because it would risk being de-listed the following year if
losses prevented dividend payment to shareholders. Such a de-listing might
lead to precipitous falls in the prices of their issuing stocks. Therefore, they
reduced their provisioning from 23,342 billion yen to 11,532 billion yen in
1996 to report a small profit and to pay customary dividends. 207
Provisioning was raised back to 25,809 billion yen in 1997. Considering the
fact that non-performing loans held by Japanese banks continued to rise
throughout the late 1990s, these coordinated actions of Japanese banks are
unexplainable unless we presume that the management of Japanese banks
were primarily driven by the above two factors.
It is apparent that rules providing for the recognition of deferred tax
assets would cushion against the full impact of loan loss provisions on
reported earnings on an unconsolidated basis. The lack of such regulations
in Japan provided substantial disincentives for the management of Japanese
202 See, e.g., Okina, supra note 86, at.25.
203 See Commercial Code, supra note 161, art. 290 para. 1.
204 See Kanaya & Woo, supra note 11, at 27.
205 id.
206 The following illustrations are based on the descriptions of facts and data introduced in Kanaya &
Woo, supra note 11, at 27, 41.
207 While the aggregate amount of dividends paid out by Japanese banks in 1995 was 710 billion yen,
in 1996 and 1997, the dividends were 675 billion yen and 687 billion yen, respectively. See Kanaya &
Woo, supra note 1l, at 41.
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banks to establish loan loss provisions for their distressed loans before those
loans would entitle them to bad debt deductions for tax purposes.
D. Mark-to-Market Rule for the Assessment of Financial Assets
1. U.S. Legislation
20 8
Under the U.S. tax provisions of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993 ("OBRA"), a "dealer in securities" is required to recognize gain
or loss on its securities for tax purposes-if not held for investment or used as
a hedge-based on the market value of the "securities" on the last business
day of the taxable year. Specifically, Section 475 of the IRC provides that
any "dealer in securities" must recognize gain or loss on any "security" that
it holds at the close of the relevant taxable year as if such security were sold
by such dealer for its fair market value on the last business day of the
year.209 The gain or loss that a "dealer" must recognize when it marks a
"security" to market is the difference between the security's adjusted basis
and its fair market value on that date.2 10 Any such gain or loss resulting
from marking the "security" to the market is generally recognized as
ordinary income or loss to the taxpayer.2
To qualify as a "dealer in securities," a taxpayer's activity can be
either the purchasing or selling of securities from or to customers.2 12 The
term "security" is defined under the IRC to include, among other things,
stocks, partnership and trust interests, notes, bonds, debentures, and other
evidences of debt.2t 3 This definition is broad enough to encompass loans
made to customers of financial institutions. 214 Because the term "security" is
broadly defined for purposes of Section 475, most U.S. banks are regarded
as "dealers in securities" and are thus subject to the above mark-to-market
tax accounting rules.2t 5 Indeed, Treasury regulations clearly indicate that the
phrase "regularly purchase securities from customers" applies to taxpayers
258 For a broad discussion of U.S. legislation on mark-to-market rules for financial institutions, see
Jack W. Hodges & Larry D. Cannon, Multistate Conformity With Federal Mark-to-Market Rules for
Financial Institutions, 12 JOURNAL OF BANK TAX'N 58 (1999).
209 I.R.C. § 475(a). For an analysis of Section 475 and related regulations, see Marc D. Levy, James
F. Malloy & Mary B. Doyle, Mark-to-Market Final Regs. Contain Significant Changes and Gaps
Requiring Further Guidance, 11 JOURNAL OF BANK TAX'N 14 (1997).
210 See Hodges & Cannon, supra note 208, at 58.
211 I.R.C. § 475(d)(3)(A)(i). See Hodges & Cannon, supra note 208, at 58.
212 I.R.C. § 475(c)(1).
213 I.R.C. § 475(c)(2). See Hodges & Cannon, supra note 208, at 59.
214 Rev. Rul. 97-39, 1997-39 I.R.B. 4 (holding 2).
215 See Hodges & Cannon, supra note 208, at 59.
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who make regular loans to customers. Accordingly, most U.S. financial
institutions are subject to the above mark-to-market tax accounting rules.
2 17
It should be noted that loan documents held by a bank and policyholder, and
loan documents held by an insurance company would both constitute
"securities" for the purpose of Section 475, and thus loans represented or
evidenced by those documents are generally subject to mark-to-market
218
accounting for tax purposes.
As a general rule, all securities held by a dealer in securities are
subject to mark-to-market tax accounting, with some exceptions. For
example, the mark-to-market rules are not applicable to securities identified
as "held for investment" or debt securities identified as "not held for sale."2 19
Thus, a security that is not held by a taxpayer primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade or business may be exempt
from the above mark-to-market tax accounting rules. 220 To exempt
securities under this provision, the securities must be clearly identified as
exempt in the dealer's records.221 To illustrate, a financial institution that
originates or acquires mortgage loans in the ordinary course of its trade or
business makes a timely identification if the identification is made in
accordance with the institution's accounting practice by no later than thirty
212days after the date of origination or acquisition.
As a result, most U.S. banks may enjoy the loss deduction for tax
purposes under Section 475 with respect to losses in their trading account
debt instruments without selling or otherwise disposing of those instruments.
Accordingly, most U.S. banks may recognize deductible losses for tax
purposes with respect to their distressed loans either under the mark-to-
market accounting rules or the bad debt deduction provisions set forth in
Section 166 of the IRC. In order to cope with this overlap, the IRS has
issued a proposed regulation that discusses the interaction between mark-to-
market and the bad debt reserve methods of tax accounting. Specifically, the
proposed regulation establishes rules for computing the mark-to-market gain
or loss for tax purposes on partially or wholly worthless loans, as well as
216 Treas. Reg. § 1.475(c)-I(c)(1)(i) (1996).
217 Hodges & Cannon, supra note 208, at 59.
218 See Rev. Rul. 97-39, 1997-39 I.R.B. 4 (holding 2).
219 I.R.C. § 475 (b)(1).
220 Treas. Reg. § 1.475(b)-1(A) (1996).
221 I.R.C. § 475 (b)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.475(b)-2 (1996).
222 Rev. Rul. 93-76, 1993-2 C.B. 235. The explanations in this paragraph are quoted from Hodges &
Cannon, supra note 208, at 59.
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providing rules for banks accounting for bad debts using the reserve method
of accounting.223
The proposed regulation is applicable to any U.S. bank that marks to
market a loan that (a) was charged off during the relevant fiscal year because
it became partially worthless, or (b) became wholly worthless during the
relevant fiscal year without regard to whether the loan was charged off.
224
Under the proposed regulation, any gain or loss attributable to marking a
loan to market is determined by deeming the loan's adjusted basis 225 to be
the loan's adjusted basis less the amount charged off during the current and
prior fiscal years.226 A loan that becomes wholly worthless is deemed to
have an adjusted basis of zero. Thus, any portion of a loss attributable to the
worthlessness of the whole or a part of a distressed loan continues to be
accounted for under the bad debt reserve provisions, and the basis of the
loan continues to be adjusted as otherwise required by the IRC.227
To the extent a loan was previously charged off, any mark-to-market
gain is treated as a recovery credited to the reserve.228  The proposed
regulation indicates that a bank using the reserve method of accounting for
bad debts must credit the reserve for any portion of mark-to-market gain that
is treated as recovery of a loan previously charged to the bad debt reserve
account.229
The proposed regulation provides additional rules applicable to
taxpayers using the reserve method of accounting for loans. First, to
determine the total loans outstanding at the close of a fiscal year, the
outstanding balance on a loan marked to market is increased or decreased by
mark-to-market gain or loss recognized, except that the outstanding balance
of the loan may never exceed the actual balance currently due.23 ° Second, if
the addition to the bad debt reserve is calculated based on a percentage of
223 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.475(a)-1(f), (g), 60 Fed. Reg. 403 (Jan. 4, 1995). See Hodges & Cannon,
supra note 208, at 68.
224 Id. § 1.475(a)-l(f)(l).
223 The debt's adjusted basis is determined under Section 1.1011-1, which provides that "[t]he
adjusted basis for determining the gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property is the cost or
other basis prescribed in Section 1012 or other applicable provision of subtitle A of the Code ...." Id.
226 Id. § 1.475(a)-l(0(l).
227 The illustrations in this paragraph are primarily based upon the explanations from Hodges &
Cannon, supra note 208, at 68.
228 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.475(a)-l(f)(2), 60 Fed. Reg. 403 (Jan. 4, 1995).
229 Id. The illustrations in this paragraph are primarily based upon the explanations from Hodges &
Cannon, supra note 208, at 68.
230 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.475(a)-l(g)(l), 60 Fed. Reg. 403 (Jan. 4, 1995).
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taxable income, any gain or loss attributable to marking a loan to market
must be taken into account in calculating taxable income.
The proposed regulation also provides an ordering rule for gains and
losses resulting from troubled loans. Troubled loans are to be recognized
first under the bad debt reserve provisions and then under the mark-to-
market accounting provisions. In determining whether to mark loans to
market, it has been noted that banks should consider four key variances
between Sections 475 and 166: (1) valuation of loans; (2) timing of gain and
loss recognition; (3) nature of gains and losses; and (4) book-tax impact.
232
First, banks should consider the different factors inherent in valuing
loans under Sections 475 and 166. Under Section 166(a), a bank may deduct
losses only when a loan becomes partially or totally worthless.233 In
determining whether partial or total worthlessness has occurred, the taxpayer
must determine the value of the loan by considering all factors relevant to
recovery of principal. 234 In contrast, loans subject to mark-to-market are
valued at their fair market value at the close of the relevant fiscal year. This
fair market value is determined based upon more than just credit risk, which
is the focus under the bad debt provisions. One of the primary factors in
determining the fair market value of a loan under mark-to-market accounting
is interest rate risk. Interest rate risk is generally greater in fixed rate loans
than in floating rate loans. By considering the differences in valuation
methods between Sections 475 and 166, a bank may discover that a loan's
fair market value is likely to be less than its credit risk valuation under the
bad debt provisions. By marking such a loan to market, the taxpayer could
receive a loss deduction under both Section 475 and Section 166. Banks,
however, must also recognize the potential risk under Section 475 for
creating taxable gain where none previously existed. Not only may interest
rate changes result in increased fair market value, but gains may also result
from the creation and recognition of attached servicing rights as separate
assets requiring a valuation in addition to the valuation of the underlying
loan.235
Second, banks should consider the potential tax benefit of accelerating
deductible losses by marking loans to the market. One of the key
differences in accounting for loans identified as exempt from mark-to-
23 Id. § 1.475(a)-I(g)(2). The illustrations in this paragraph are primarily based upon the
explanations from Hodges & Cannon, supra note 208, at 69.
232 Hodges & Cannon, supra note 208, at 69.
233 I.R.C. § 166(a).
234 Treas. Reg. § 1.166-2(a) (1993).
235 The illustrations in this paragraph are primarily quoted from Hodges & Cannon, supra note 208, at
69-70.
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market and accounting for those subject to mark-to-market is the timing of
gain or loss recognition for tax purposes. When a loan is identified as
exempt from mark-to-market tax accounting, gain or loss will not be
recognized under Section 166 until sale or other disposition of the loan or
charge-off of the loan. In contrast, the accounting for a loan subject to
mark-to-market reflects changes in its fair market value. As such, taxable
gain or deductible loss recognition on a loan subject to mark-to-market
accounting can occur at the end of every fiscal year. By marking a loan to
market, a taxpayer may recognize a loan's decrease in value at an earlier
stage during the loan's life cycle. If a loan is exempt from mark-to-market,
the taxpayer must wait until a later period to recognize any loss. By marking
the loan to market, the taxpayer may accelerate its loss deduction with
respect to the loan's decrease in value. 
2 36
Third, taxpayer banks should consider the nature of gains and losses
that may be recognized under Sections 475 and 166. Specifically, the mark-
to-market provisions allow a taxpayer bank to take advantage of temporary
changes in valuation from year to year, whereas losses recognized under
Section 166 are permanent. Both gain and loss may be recognized for tax
purposes under mark-to-market tax accounting, while only deductible losses
may be recognized under Section 166.237
Finally, taxpayer banks should consider the book and tax treatment
under both Sections 475 and 166. A bad debt deduction under Section 166
is conditioned upon a charge-off of the loan in question recognized for book
purposes as well as tax purposes. In contrast, under Section 475,
corresponding book recognition is not required in order to recognize
238deductible loss for tax purposes.
2. Japanese Legislation
Unlike the United States, Japan did not have any legislation
corresponding to Section 475 of the IRC until 2000. 239 Therefore,
throughout the 1990s, Japanese banks did not enjoy tax advantages from
earlier loss recognition with respect to securities in their trading accounts
under mark-to-market tax accounting rules.240
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 The United States has had such legislation in place since 1993.
240 SCOTrI & IWAHARA, supra note 27, at 43.
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On March 24, 2000, amendments to the CTA ("2000 Amendments")
were approved in the Japanese Diet. Under these amendments, effective for
fiscal years beginning on or after April 1, 2000, all Japanese corporations are
subject to mark-to-market accounting with respect to their securities. This
requires the corporations to recognize gain or loss on their securities for tax
purposes-if held for trading or sale-based on their present market value. 24I
Although the basic framework of the mark-to-market accounting rules
set forth in the 2000 Amendments and relevant regulations is mostly the
same as that in the United States, there are some significant differences
between the Japanese rules and the U.S. rules. The most important
difference is the scope of "securities" that are subject to mark-to-market tax
accounting. Under the 2000 Amendments and relevant regulations, Japanese
banks are subject to mark-to-market tax accounting so long as they hold any
"securities" (such as notes, bonds, debentures, certificate of deposits, or
commercial papers, or stocks) for trading or sale, which is different than
U.S. tax policy. For instance, mere evidences of debt are excluded from the
definition of "securities," unless they legally represent the rights and
obligations of underlying loans.242 As a result, unlike U.S. banks, Japanese
banks may not, in general, enjoy the loss deduction without actually selling
or otherwise disposing of those loans, even if they intentionally hold them in
their trading accounts or book them as "for sale." Unlike U.S. policy, no
regulations or releases issued by the Japanese tax authority indicate that loan
documents held by a bank, or policyholder loan documents held by an
insurance company, constitute "securities" for the purpose of the mark-to-
market accounting rules. 243 Thus, loans only evidenced by those documents
are generally not subject to mark-to-market accounting for tax purposes.
Accordingly, even after the enactment of the 2000 Amendments, Japanese
banks are generally not entitled to recognize deductible losses under the
above mark-to-market accounting rules and may recognize deductible losses
with respect to their troubled loans only under the bad debt deduction
provisions.
As a result, even today, Japanese banks may not, in general, accelerate
the recognition of deductible loss with respect to their bad loans by marking
a loan to market and thus recognizing that loan's decrease in value at an
241 CTA 1998, supra note 74, art. 61-3 (newly introduced by Law No. 14 of 2000); H6jin-zei h6 sek6
rei, dai 119 j6 no 13 [Corporation Tax Act Enforcement Cabinet Order] art. 119-13 (newly introduced by
Cabinet Order No. 145 of 2000) (Japan).
242 See CTA, supra note 74, art. 2.22 (as amended by Law No. 14 of 2000); H6jin-zei hO sek6 rei, dai
II j6 [Corporation Tax Act Enforcement Cabinet Order] art. 11 (as amended by Cabinet Order No. 145 of
2000) (Japan); KokuzeichO hjin-zei kihon tsfitatsu [Tax Agency Basic Circulars on CTA] 6-3-3.
243 See I.R.C. § 475(c)(2); Rev. Rul. 97-39, 1997-2 C.B. 62; IRS News Release 93-78 (Sept. 2, 1993).
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earlier stage during its life cycle. Therefore, the treatment in Japan before
and after the 2000 Amendments and the treatment in the United States under
Section 475 of the IRC differ significantly.
E. The Inapplicability of the Rule for Delinquent Interest2"
1. Under Japanese Tax Treatments
Under Japanese tax treatments, interest on loan principal is generally
recognized on an accrual basis unless the ability to collect that interest is
regarded as very doubtful. The Japanese tax authority has taken basically
the same position as the United States regarding the non-recognition of
taxable income for interest to be accrued on a delinquent (or otherwise
defaulted) loan or other account receivable held by a corporation other than
a financial institution.
Some Japanese commentators, however, argue that the Japanese tax
authority has taken a relatively generous view concerning the non-
recognition of taxable income for interest exclusively for financial
institutions.2 45 The NTA has long provided taxpayer corporations with two
sets of safe-harbor rules, including bright-line tests, in connection with a
period of delinquency in payment of accrued interest. As a general rule, all
Japanese corporations may suspend the recognition of interest to be accrued
on its loan principal during the relevant fiscal year for tax purposes if any
one of the following events occurs: (1) all of the interest accrued as of the
date falling one year before the end of such fiscal year remains unpaid at the
end of such fiscal year and virtually no interest has been paid during the
latest one year period due to the insolvency or other difficulties of the
relevant debtor; (2) a bankruptcy or other similar proceeding has been
initiated with respect to the relevant debtor; (3) it has proven to be difficult
to collect all or a substantial portion of the relevant loan principal due to the
fact that the relevant debtor has remained insolvent for a certain period and
has lost the expectancy for successful continuation of its business or that the
relevant debtor has suffered severe damages; or (4) any payment of all or a
substantial portion of the relevant loan principal is determined to be frozen
for a period of two years or more by a court decision approving a
244 For a more in depth discussion of non-recognition of the rule for delinquent interest, see Yoshida,
supra note 61, at 55-56.
245 See Yoshida, supra note 61, at 55; TAKAHASHI, supra note 96, at 14.
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reorganization plan for the debtor corporation or by a resolution of the
creditors' assembly.
246
A special ruling under the CTA, which was issued by the NTA in
September 1966247 allows a creditor corporation to refrain from recognizing
delinquent interest as assets in certain circumstances. It states that with
respect to financial institutions, if (1) no interest had been paid during the
period from the last interest due date that is prior to the date falling six
months before the end of the fiscal year through the end of such fiscal year
and (2) the relevant creditor cannot or can hardly collect any delinquent
interest (i) that had already accrued as of the last interest due date which was
prior to the date falling six months before the end of the relevant fiscal year
and (ii) that remained unpaid and outstanding as of the end of the
immediately preceding fiscal year, then the creditor corporation may refrain
from recognizing all of the delinquent interest accrued during the relevant
fiscal year as assets and may suspend recognition of that interest in the
calculation of taxable income. Further, the special ruling also provides that
even if any delinquent interest was recognized as assets as of the end of the
fiscal year, the relevant creditor may deduct that accrued but delinquent
interest as bad debt, so long as the creditor has failed, despite his or her
reasonable efforts to demand the payments, to collect any portion thereof for
at least two years.
Those treatments (the so-called "6-month or 2-year" rules) are, unlike
the counterpart rules in the United States, applicable categorically,
irrespective of (1) whether or not the principal on which such interest is
accrued is secured by any security interests, (2) the extent to which such
principal is secured by collateral, and (3) whether or not such principal is or
is becoming completely worthless or partially worthless. Surprisingly, under
Japanese tax practices, the debtor of the principal need not be insolvent for
any delinquent interest to qualify for non-recognition or bad debt deduction
for tax purposes. These rules are applicable to all commercial banks, thrifts,
securities firms, insurance companies, and other financial institutions.
Essentially, if a financial institution has failed to collect any portion of
accrued interest for six months, it will be allowed to exclude that accrued
interest as taxable income for tax purposes. In addition, if it has failed to
receive, for at least two years, any payment for accrued interest that had
246 See Kokuzeich6 h6jin-zei kihon tsfitatsu [Tax Agency Basic Circulars on CTA] 2-1-15.
247 Kokuzeich6 h6jin-zei kihon tsOtatsu [Tax Agency Basic Circulars on CTA], Kin'yO kikan no
mishil risoku no toriatsukai ni tsuite [Tax Treatments for Accrued but Unpaid Interest Claims Held by
Financial Institution], Choku-shin (h) 72 of 1966 (amended in 1997).
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already been acknowledged as assets for accounting purposes, that accrued
interest may be charged off and deducted as expenses for tax purposes.
2. Under U.S. Tax Treatments
248
Like Japan, the United States generally recognizes interest on loan
principal on an accrual basis, unless the ability to collect that interest is
regarded as very doubtful. 249 As mentioned before, some Japanese
commentators have argued that the IRS has long adhered to a more stringent
policy regarding what it considers to be an inability to collect loan interest
for tax purposes than that taken by the Japanese tax authority.250 Certainly,
under the tax practices of the IRS, non-recognition of interest accrual for tax
purposes is, generally, not automatic, either upon the borrower's default in
the payment of interest or when a bank regulatory agency requires
suspension of accrual. 251 The IRS has declared in its Coordinated Issue
Papers that interest accrual must continue until (1) the bank, bank examiner
or regulatory agency has given specific written instructions that the loan
principal upon which the interest accrues should be charged off in whole or
in part, or (2) on loans not charged off, the taxpayer substantiates that the
-252interest is "uncollectible." According to this guideline, the U.S. banks
may not, in principle, refrain from recognizing interest income concerning
their delinquent interest for tax purposes until they charge off the relevant
loan principal. In addition, the IRS has stated that "it can be seen that there
appears to be agreement on the basic law in the area; however, it is not
believed that merely because an account becomes 30 days or more past due
there is little or no likelihood of collection in the future. 253 Therefore, at
first blush, the U.S. tax authority appears to be more reluctant than the
Japanese authority to allow financial institutions to abstain from recognizing
accrual of interest for income tax purposes.
248 For an in-depth discussion of U.S. delinquent interest, see BLASI, supra note 64, at 319-322.
249 See I.R.C. § 446; Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (2001).
250 See Yoshida, supra note 61, at 55; TAKAHASHI, supra note 96, at 14.
251 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(2)(ii) (2001); Rev. Rul. 80-361, 1980-2 C.B. 164.
252 See I.R.S., ISP Paper Explains Interest Accrual on Delinquent Loans, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 8.,
1992, available at LEXIS, Taxation Library [hereinafter ISP Paper]. See also id. at 102.05 (discussion of
the Claim of Right Doctrine); Tech. Adv. Mem. 83-17-004 (May 19, 1981) (containing approval by the IRS
of discontinuance of accrual when the taxpayer, on a loan-by-loan basis, determined that interest was
uncollectible. Some commentators pointed out that under the tax practices ofIRS, ifa loan is substantially
charged off, accrual on the entire loan may be discontinued. See BLASI, supra note 64, at 319-20 n.132.253 See ISP Paper, supra note 252.
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However, with respect to this standard, the IRS has issued Revenue
Ruling 81-18,254 which specifically discussed the issue of whether a taxpayer
thrift may refrain from recognizing the accrual of interest. In this Ruling,
the taxpayer thrift charge-off interest accrued on the books and in default for
ninety days pursuant to regulations of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
("FHLBB") 255 and the charge-off was confirmed in writing by the FHLBB
examiners upon the first audit of the thrift following the charge-off.25 6 The
taxpayer did not offer any evidence to show that the interest was not
collectible, nor did it charge off any of the principal. Based upon this
finding of fact, the IRS concluded that the charge-off, as confirmed by the
bank examiners, was conclusive evidence that the interest due and payable
was not collectible, and thus the non-recognition by the taxpayer of future
accruals of interest was automatically justified.25 7 This conclusion was
obviously based on the applicability of Treas. Reg. § 1.166-2(d), which
provides a conclusive presumption of worthlessness if (1) a loan is charged
off in compliance with the specific orders of a bank regulator, or (2) a loan is
charged off and the charge-off is confirmed in writing by the appropriate
bank regulator upon its examination of the bank following the charge-off.258
Subsequently this Ruling was confirmed in IRS Technical Advice
Memorandum 82-51-001,259 a private letter ruling involving two savings and
loan institutions. In this ruling, the IRS expressly stated that it is
unnecessary for the taxpayer to charge-off the underlying debt, provided that
the requirements of Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.166-2(d) are met.26 ° If there is no
charge-off of the accrued and taxed delinquent interest, a loan-by-loan
analysis will normally be required under the U.S. tax treatments, because the
conclusive presumption of Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.166-2(d) is unavailable.26'
Recognition of interest income must be reinstated if the debtor's
circumstances change such that the ability to collect is assured.262
254 Rev. Rul. 81-18, 1981-1 C.B. 295.
255 12 C.F.R. § 563c.1 l(b)(1) (1987) provides that interest shall be classified "uncollectible" if any
portion thereof is due but uncollected for a period in excess of 90 days, with certain exceptions. This
provision then provides that "[a]t least quarterly, appropriate income accounts shall be charged with the
amount of uncollectible income and a corresponding amount shall be credited to an account or accounts
descriptive of uncollectible income." See BLASI, supra note 64, at 320 n.134.
256 It is understood that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency does not issue confirmation
letters. However, state banks receive such letters from Federal Reserve Board bank examiners.
257 See BLASt, supra note 64, at 320.
258 See id.
259 Tech. Adv. Mem. 82-51-001 (Dec. 15, 1981)
260 See BLASt, supra note 64, at 320.
261 Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-37-004 (May 19, 1981). See BLASI, supra note 64, at 321.
262 Clifton Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 137 F.2d 290 (4th Cir. 1943). Clifton arose on appeal from the Tax
Court, which discussed but did not decide the issue. Subsequently, in New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v.
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The threshold set forth in Revenue Ruling 81-18 has generally been
considered to be applicable to commercial banks as well, since there does
not appear to be any rational justification for a distinction in the treatment of
thrifts and commercial banks.
263
The standard of proof for the non-recognition of interest accrual for
tax purposes differs from the test for charging off a bad debt264 to obtain the
bad debt deduction. In Corn Exchange Bank v. U.S.,265 the Second Circuit
stated that "[i]t is not necessary that there be equally as strong evidence [to
discontinue interest accrued] as warrants charging off an account as a loss,
as in the case of a bad debt., 266 The Board of Tax Appeals earlier held that a
reasonable doubt as to the ability of the debtor to pay justified reporting to
the tax authority only the amount of interest that was actually received.26
If interest is accrued as taxable income (and recognized as assets for
accounting purposes) and subsequently becomes uncollectible, the bank may
268be entitled to take a loan loss deduction. There is no specific safe harbor
rule with any bright-line period of no payment with respect to when that
accrued interest is deemed to be "uncollectible" for tax purposes. It is
considered to be improper to reverse the accrual by reducing interest
income. 269 Thus, if during the taxable year a loan is determined to be
"uncollectible," accrual of interest is first recognized for tax purposes up to
the date on which such uncollectibility is determined. 270 Thereafter, a loan
loss deduction will be allowed for the accrued but "uncollectible" interest.
3. Analysis
Although there is no bright-line safe harbor rule for the non-
recognition of delinquent interest as taxable income in the United States, the
conclusion that U.S. tax treatments are always more stringent than those of
Comm'r, 2 T.C. 708 (1943), affd, 146 F.2d 697 (1st Cir. 1945), the Tax Court indicated its approval of the
Court of Appeals decision.
263 See, e.g., BLASI, supra note 64, at 319-20.
264 Id. at 319-21.
263 Corn Exchange Bank v. U.S., 37 F.2d 34, (2d Cir. 1930). This holding was confirmed by Johnson
v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1982-517,44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1076, 1083 (1982).
266 Corn Exchange Bank, 37 F.2d at 35.
267 Atlantic Coast Line R.R Co. v. Comm'r, 31 B.T.A. 730, 749 (B.T.A 1934), af'd, 81 F.2d 309
(C.C.A. 1936). See BLASI, supra note 64, at 321.
268 See BLASI, supra note 64, at 321.
269 Spring City Foundry Co. v. Comm'r, 292 U.S. 182, 185 (1934). See also ISP Paper, supra note
252 (discussion of the Claim of Right Doctrine).
270 Rev. Rul. 80-361, 1980-2 C.B. 164; Rev. Rul. 81-18, 1981-1 C.B. 295. See BLASI, supra note 64,
at 321.
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Japan in this particular instance 271 does not necessarily follow. Ironically,
Japanese "generous" tax treatments for accrued and delinquent interest
might decrease possible tax incentives for Japanese banks to dispose of their
distressed loans on a timely basis. Under those rules, Japanese banks are not
required to charge off their relevant non-performing loan principal in order
to avoid income taxation on their accrued and delinquent interest, that
increases continuously as time passes.
F. Restructuring of Troubled Debts
1. Under U.S. Tax Treatments
272
In the United States, there is a set of sophisticated bright-line rules
that deal with a "restructuring" or alteration of debt instruments as potential
taxable events. This set of rules was incorporated into the Treasury
Regulations 273 under Section 1001 of the IRC in 1992 and is specifically
focused on the issue of whether a "restructuring" or alteration would be
treated as a "realization event" that triggers tax consequences.
The genesis of this set of rules is the 1991 Supreme Court decision in
Cottage Savings Ass 'n v. Comm 'r,2 74 which held that the exchange of
participation interests in home mortgage loans by two savings and loans
("S&Ls") was a "taxable exchange," even though the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board ("FHLBB"), which at that time regulated S&Ls, concluded that
the loans were substantially identical for accounting purposes. The issue in
this case was whether a taxpayer S&L could realize tax-deductible losses
when it exchanged its interests in one group of residential mortgage loans
for another S&L's interests in a different group of residential mortgage
loans. Under the new accounting directive issued by the FHLBB, S&Ls
were able to recognize tax-deductible losses associated with mortgages that
were exchanged for "substantially identical" mortgages held by other
lenders, without reporting losses for accounting purposes. The FHLBB's
acknowledged purpose for such regulation was to facilitate transactions that
would generate tax losses but would not substantially affect the economic
271 See Yoshida, supra note 61, at 55; TAKAHASHI, supra note 96, at 14.
272 For a discussion of U.S. tax treatments for restructuring troubled debts, see generally Lorence L.
Bravenec & David N. Hurtt, Modifications of Debt Instruments as Taxable Exchanges, 75 TAXES 369
(1997).
273 Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3 (1996).
274 Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
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position of the transacting S&Ls. The Court concluded that such a
transaction did give rise to deductible losses for tax purposes.
In Cottage Savings, the petitioner S&L sold "90% participation
interests" in 252 mortgages to four S&Ls. It simultaneously purchased
"90% participation interests" in 305 mortgages held by these S&Ls. 275 All
of the loans involved in the transaction were secured by single-family
homes, most in the same geographical area. The fair market value of the
package of participation interests exchanged by each side was approximately
$4.5 million. The face value of the participation interests relinquished by
the petitioner S&L in the transaction was approximately $6.9 million. The
petitioner S&L claimed a tax deduction of approximately $2.5 million,
which represented the adjusted difference between the face value of the
participation interests that it traded and the fair market value of the
participation interests that it received. The principal issue in dispute was
whether the transaction constituted a "disposition of property" under §
1001(a) of the IRC. The Commissioner argued that an exchange of property
can be treated as a "disposition" under § 1001(a) only if the properties
exchanged are "materially different" and that, because the underlying
mortgages were essentially economic substitutes, the participation interests
exchanged by the petitioner were not "materially different" from those
received from the other S&Ls.
Based upon the foregoing findings, the Supreme Court held the
following:
Neither the language nor the history of the Code indicates
whether and to what extent property exchanged must differ to
count as a "disposition of property" under § 1001(a).
Nonetheless, we readily agree with the Commissioner that an
exchange of property gives rise to a realization event under §
1001(a) only if the properties exchanged are "materially
different." 276.. Precisely what constitutes a "material
difference" for purposes of § 1001(a) of the Code is a more
complicated question. The Commissioner argues that
properties are "materially different" only if they differ in
economic substance. To determine whether the participation
275 By exchanging merely participation interests rather than the loans themselves, each party retained
its relationship with the individual obligors. Consequently, each S&L continued to service the loans with
respect to which it had transferred the participation interests and made monthly payments to the
participation interest-holders.
2 6 Cottage Savings Ass n, 499 U.S. at 560.
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interests exchanged in this case were "materially different" in
this sense, the Commissioner argues, we should look to the
attitudes of the parties, the evaluation of the interests by the
secondary mortgage market, and the views of the FHLBB. We
conclude that § 1001(a) embodies a much less demanding and
277less complex test. . . . Under our interpretation of § 1001(a),
an exchange of property gives rise to a realization event so long
as the exchanged properties are "materially different"-that is,
so long as they embody legally distinct entitlements. [The
petitioner]'s transactions at issue here easily satisfy this test.
Because the participation interests exchanged [between the
petitioner] and the other S&L's derived from loans that were
made to different obligors and secured by different homes, the
exchanged interests did embody legally distinct entitlements.
Consequently, we conclude that [the petitioner] realized its
losses [for tax purposes] at the point of the exchange.278
The IRS issued the aforementioned set of regulations in response to
the ambiguous holding in Cottage Savings. The lack of clarity of the
meaning of Cottage Savings had been felt acutely, especially in the area of
debt modifications, and some commentators expressed concerns that Cottage
Savings might have created a "hair trigger" test for realization upon the
modification of debt instruments. Thus, the IRS issued the set of regulations
to define what constitutes a "significant modification" of a debt instrument
such that the parties are deemed to have "exchanged" a modified instrument
for the original debt.
279
Under these new regulations, if the parties agree to substantially
change any major terms of a debt instrument, a "taxable exchange" will be
deemed to have occurred.28° Major terms include (1) changing the yield by
more than twenty-five basis points; (2) extending the loan term by an
amount in excess of the shorter of five years or half of the original loan term;
or (3) vesting in a borrower a right to accelerate the payment of the loan
principal or vesting in a lender a right to prepayment.
This treatment of a "restructuring" or alteration as a taxable exchange
could have significant tax consequences, both favorable and unfavorable, to
277 Id. at 562.
27 Id. at 566.
279 See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 41, at 175.
280 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3(e)(1) (1996).
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taxpayers. 281 For example, if the holder's basis in the old debt instrument
was less than the new instrument's fair market value, the restructuring of
troubled debt could give rise to recognized loss for tax purposes to its holder
at the same time that the holder would have to recognize taxable gain if a
non-recognition provision were applicable. 282 In summary, for a
"restructuring" or alteration of a debt instrument to be a "taxable exchange"
under the above regulations, two conditions must be satisfied: (1) the
alteration must be a "modification" and (2) this modification must be
"significant., 283 Appendix 2, infra, illustrates the correlation of the rules
relating to the "modification" requirement and those relating to the
"significant" requirement.
Further, it should be noted that sometimes both U.S. courts and bank
regulators have allowed certain U.S. financial institutions to recognize losses
only for tax purposes without booking corresponding losses for accounting
purposes in order to strengthen the financial soundness of those institutions.
For instance, as mentioned in Cottage Savings, on June 27, 1980, the
FHLBB issued a regulatory directive generally known as "Memorandum R-
49," officially titled, "Reciprocal Sales of Mortgage Loans. 284 In the late
1970s, many S&Ls held numerous long-term, low-interest mortgages that
declined in value as a result of the surge of interest rates during that period.
These institutions would have benefited from selling their devalued
mortgages in order to realize tax-deductible losses. They were, however,
deterred from doing so by the existing FHLBB accounting regulations,
which required them to record the losses on their books to recognize
deductible losses for tax purposes. Reporting these losses in conformity
with the then-effective FHLBB accounting regulations would have placed
many S&Ls in financial difficulties, including the risk of closure by the
FHLBB. In response to this situation, the FHLBB relaxed its requirements
for the reporting of losses by issuing Memorandum R-49 to facilitate
transactions that would generate tax losses and, thus, mitigate the financial
difficulties of S&Ls resulting from such devaluations of their mortgage
loans.285 Under Memorandum R-49, S&Ls were exempted from reporting
losses associated with mortgages that were exchanged for "substantially
281 See Bravenec & Hurtt, supra note 272, at 370.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Memorandum R-49 was rescinded effective as of Oct. 21, 1991, but was incorporated into the
OTS' Thrift Activities Handbook Section 470 as of the same date by Regulatory Bulletin 1-la issued by the
OTS. See Office of Thrift Supervision, Recission of Memorandum and Bulletins, Reg. Bull. 1-lb, at 7
(Jan. 13, 1995), at http://www.ots.treas.gov/bltnregulatoryhtm
285 See Cottage Savings Ass 'n, 499 U.S. at 557.
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identical" mortgages held by other lenders, even when they had recognized
those losses for income tax purposes. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Cottage
Savings, officially endorsed the position that S&Ls were entitled to
recognize deductible losses generated by such types of exchanges for tax
286purposes without reporting losses for accounting purposes.
The U.S. system has been quite flexible in the recognition of losses for
tax purposes in connection with distressed bank loans. If there is some
legitimate business necessity and reasonable justification for recognizing
losses for tax purposes from the viewpoint of the Haig-Simons income
doctrine, the U.S. system in many instances has not hesitated to allow
financial institutions to recognize deductible losses only for tax purposes
without reporting losses for accounting purposes. It has not always clung to
the formalistic "principle" that to be recognized as deductible losses for tax
purposes, those losses should first be recognized and reported as losses for
accounting purposes.
2. Under Japanese Tax Treatments
Under Japanese tax law and practice, even if the material terms of a
debt instrument are changed or modified, its holder has traditionally not
been allowed to recognize any loss or gain for tax purposes as a result of
such change or modification. This applies to an instrument that does not fall
within the category of a "security" and that is not sold, relinquished or
otherwise disposed. Japanese tax authorities are, however, able to recognize
taxable gains or to refuse to recognize deductible losses for such holder or its
counter-party, if any material terms of the debt instrument are changed or
modified. For example, if a creditor reduces the interest rate of a loan to a
debtor without any justifiable reason, the tax authority may ignore such
reduction of the interest rate and recognize the accrual of taxable income at
the original interest rate for such creditor.
287
In Japan, the taxpayer holder of a debt instrument may in certain cases
disregard a change to the material terms and, thus, defy the challenge by the
286 Note that Justice Blackman stated as follows in his dissenting opinion in Cottage Savings:
I find it somewhat surprising that an agency not responsible for tax matters would presume to
dictate what is or is not a deductible loss for federal income tax purposes. I had thought that that
was something within the exclusive province of the Internal Revenue Service, subject to
administrative and judicial review.
Id. at 569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
287 CTA 1998, supra note 74, arts. 22 para. 2, 37 para. 7. See KANEKO, supra note 32, at 245-46,
279-81.
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tax authority to recognize taxable income or to disallow deductions for tax
purposes. For example, if a Japanese bank reduces the interest rate of a loan
to a certain debtor, the bank may not recognize any loss for tax purposes
corresponding to the decrease in the fair market value of the principal of
such loan. However, the bank will be allowed, under certain limited
circumstances, to exclude as taxable income an amount of interest equal to
the difference between the arm's-length interest rate and such reduced
interest rate. In addition, unlike the United States, Japan has no set of
sophisticated bright-line rules that deal with a "restructuring" or alteration of
debt instruments in terms of income tax treatments. The rules applicable to
the "restructuring" of debt instruments are fragmented and disorganized.
There are only several isolated guidelines dealing with the reduction of an
interest rate to be accrued on loan principal or with the extension of the
maturity of a loan, in addition to a set of guidelines dealing with the release
of a debt obligation.
The following is an outline of the major relevant guidelines issued by
the NTA in connection with the "restructuring" of troubled loans:
(1) When a corporation relinquishes the whole or part of its loan
principal on a loan to its subsidiary or other debtor, the corporation is
allowed to recognize a deductible loss corresponding to the amount of
the loan so relinquished, so long as such relinquishment is executed
for the purpose of avoiding a larger loss to be incurred in the future or
for some other compelling reason.288
(2) When a corporation relinquishes the whole or a portion of its loan
principal on a loan to its subsidiary or other debtor, the corporation is
allowed to recognize a deductible loss corresponding to the amount of
the loan so relinquished, so long as such reduction or release is
executed to prevent the troubled debtor from going bankrupt and is
based upon a reasonable rehabilitation plan or otherwise based upon
any reasonable justification.289
(3) When a corporation reduces or waives an interest rate to be accrued
upon its loan principal on a loan to its subsidiary or other debtor, the
corporation is allowed to not recognize taxable income corresponding
to the amount of interest equal to the difference between the arm's-
length interest rate and the reduced or released interest rate. This is
permitted so long as the reduction or release is executed to prevent
2. Kokuzeicha hjin-zei kihon tstatsu [Tax Agency Basic Circulars on CTA] 9-4-1.
289 Kokuzeich6 h6jin-zei kihon tsfitatsu [Tax Agency Basic Circulars on CTA] 9-6-1(1).
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the troubled debtor from going bankrupt and is based upon a
reasonable rehabilitation plan or otherwise based upon any reasonable
justification.2 9 °
(4) When the loan term is extended or an installment payment plan is
introduced for the repayment of loan principal based upon a decision
of either a competent bankruptcy court, a reasonable resolution at a
creditors' meeting or a reasonable agreement entered into by and
among creditors through mediation by a neutral third party, a
taxpayer creditor may establish a loan loss provision and deduct for
tax purposes the amount of loan principal as is determined to be
necessary to be repaid more than five years after the close of the
fiscal year in which the above decision is made. 29 1 Further, as to the
extension of interest due dates, the aforementioned "six months"
threshold and "two years" threshold for financial institutions 292 are
also applicable. (In essence, these provide that if a financial
institution has failed to collect any portion of accrued interest for six
months, it will be allowed to not recognize that accrued interest as
taxable income, and if it has failed to receive for at least two years
any payment of accrued interest, such accrued interest may be
charged off and deducted as an expense for tax purposes.)
In addition to the foregoing, unlike the United States, Japan had a
significant tax impediment to the bulk sale of distressed loans until late
1998. Until December 4, 1998, there was no pertinent authority (including
any guidelines or rulings of the tax authority) allowing taxpayers to estimate,
for tax purposes, the fair market value of a mortgage loan based upon the
expected cash flows to be earned from the relevant mortgage in the future.
Also lacking were explicit guidelines on estimating the fair market value of
distressed (mortgage) loans.293 As a result, whenever a Japanese taxpayer
wished to sell his or her distressed loans in bulk, the taxpayer would be
subject to the substantial risk that the tax authority might challenge the
"fairness" of the sale price of such bulk loans, finding that the fair market
value of those loans should be higher than the actual price. Such a risk
could result in the tax authority disapproving the recognition of certain
capital losses generated by the bulk sale and could require recognition of the
corresponding amount of taxable "donation income" to the purchaser of
290 Kokuzeich6 hjin-zei kihon tsftatsu [Tax Agency Basic Circulars on CTA] 9-4-2.
291 CTA 1988, supra note 74, art. 52, para 1.1; CTA Order, supra note 74, art. 96, para. 1.1.
292 See supra Part III.E. 1.
293 See OSHIMA & NISHIMURA, supra note 24, at 95-96.
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those loans.294 This risk was largely eliminated as of December 4, 1998, by
the issuance of a new NTA tax guideline.295 In estimating the fair market
value of loans or underlying real estate mortgages, this guideline allows
taxpayers to rely on an appraisal conducted in accordance with a reasonable
method acknowledged by the Japanese Institute of Certified Public
Accountants or the Japanese Association of Real Estate Appraisal. One such
reasonable method is the capitalization of expected earnings method.
Unlike the U.S. system, the Japanese system has been extremely
stringent with respect to recognizing deductible "losses" in connection with
distressed bank loans purely for tax purposes. Under Japanese tax
treatments, unless a special statute allowing it exists, no "loss" will be
recognized for tax purposes without first being recognized and reported as a
296loss for accounting purposes. Moreover, there exists no counterpart or
other treatments similar to Memorandum R-49. In essence, Japan has never
had a comprehensive and coherent framework for providing tax incentives to
facilitate the restructuring of troubled loans and expedite the disposition of
non-performing loans held by financial institutions.
G. NOL Carryback for Commercial Banks and Tax Treatments
Specifically Focusing on Banks
1. U.S. Legislation
a. The original enactment of the ten-year NOL carryback for
commercial banks
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, there was no special net
operating loss ("NOL") carryback provision for commercial banks under the
294 It has been pointed out that, ordinarily, the purchase price in this kind of bulk sale is, both in the
United States and in Japan, agreed by and between the parties, based upon such estimation of the future
returns from the underlying mortgages, to be approximately 10% of the aggregate face value of the
distressed loans to be transferred. See id. at 93, 97-98, 120. Therefore, the impact of the tax risk of the
disallowance of recognition of deductible capital losses was prohibitive for this kind of transaction. In
order to eliminate this substantial tax risk, a bill (Fud~san ni kansuru kenri tO no chOsei ni kansuru rinji
sochi han [the Bill of Temporary Measurement Act Concerning the Coordination of the Rights and Other
Interests in Connection with Real Estates]), which was designed to provide for the elimination of such risk
for the sale of loans or other assets in certain cases was submitted to the Diet in October 1998. It was not,
however, passed by the Diet. See id. at 19, 106-07.
29' See Kokuzeich6 hrrei kaishaku tstitatsu [Statutes and Regulations Interpretation Circular], Tekisei
hyoka tetsuzuki ni motozuite santei sareru saiken oyobi fury6 saiken tanpo fud~san no kagaku no zeimu-jO
no toriatsukai ni tsuite [Tax Treatments for the Market Value of Loans or Real Estate Collaterals Securing
Distressed Loans Estimated Through the Due Appraisal Process], KA-HO 2-14, SA-CHO 4-20, Dec. 4, 1998.
296 CTA 1998, supra note 74, art. 22, para. 4.
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IRC. Under the 1954 IRC, which was in effect until the enactment of the
1969 Tax Reform Act, a commercial bank's NOL was treated like that of
any other taxpayer. As such, an NOL for a commercial bank could be used
as a carryback for each of the three taxable years preceding the taxable year
of the lOSS. 29 7 Therefore, a commercial bank was, like other companies,
entitled to claim a refund to recover the income tax already paid for any of
such three years under such treatment.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 extended this ordinary carryback period
for commercial banks. It extended the period from three to ten years by
providing that "in the case of a financial institution [such as a commercial
bank] ... a[n] NOL for any taxable year beginning after December 31, 1975,
shall be a[n] NOL carryback to each of the 10 taxable years preceding the
taxable year of such loss and shall be a[n] NOL carryover [i.e.,
carryforward] to each of the 5 taxable years following the taxable year of
such loss.
' 298
According to the Ways and Means Committee Report issued by the
House of Representatives, this ten-year carryback provision was designed to
provide commercial banks with an extra margin of safety in the event that an
unusually devastating bad-debt loss might occur.299 Generally, with regard
to bad-debt losses, the bad-debt reserves for commercial banks that still
existed at that time were supposed to be adequate to cover losses and to
protect the banks.300 Congress decided, however, that in order "to provide
an extra margin of safety to protect against the possibility of unusually large
bad debt losses, banks will be permitted to carry back net operating losses
for ten years instead of two years as under present law ... In addition,
commercial banks will be permitted, as under present law, to carry forward
net operating losses for five years."' 30 Thus, the ten-year carryback
provision was enacted for the purpose of protecting the banking industry
from the adverse economic consequences of severe bad-debt losses.
Leaders in the banking industry have since provided other
explanations as to why Congress originally chose to enact the ten-year NOL
carryback provision. According to Mr. W. Dean Cannon, the president of
the California League of Savings Institutions, ". . . [when] Congress granted
savings institutions the authority to carry net operating losses back 10 years
to recover taxes already paid . . . Congress explicitly acknowledged that
297 See I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A) (1954).
298 I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(F) (1969) (emphasis added).
299 H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 121 (1969).
'0' See id.
301 id.
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accepting short-term deposits to fund long-term mortgage loans made thrifts
vulnerable to losses when interest rates rise rapidly." 30 2 Moreover, "the
housing depression of 1981-82 proved the wisdom of this measure . . .
[When] (f)orced to pay high market rates for deposits, while carrying old,
low-interest loans on the books, the industry as a whole experienced losses
totaling nearly $9 billion." 303 While these losses were undoubtedly
devastating, they were not as bad as they might have been had the ten-year
NOL carryback provision not been in place. According to a letter that
Representative Glenn Anderson of California received from W. Dean
Cannon, ".... [I]f the ten-year carryback provision of the 1969 law had not
been available to restore much-needed capital, far fewer institutions would
have survived.,
30 4
While the banking industry may have felt that the ten-year carryback
provision helped to provide capital in terms of high market interest rates,
Congress made it quite clear that the provision was intended to provide relief
from bad-debt losses. In other words, although the ten-year carryback
provision may have benefited the banking industry in other ways, it was
originally enacted in order to protect commercial banks from suffering
unusually large NOLs resulting from bad-debt losses that could not be
adequately protected by normal bad-debt reserves.
b. Amendment to the ten-year NOL carryback
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 introduced the extended ten-year
carryback provision for financial institutions. However, the implementation
of Tax Reform Act of 1986 expressly limited the provision.
Before 1986, a commercial bank could apply an NOL carryback to the
prior ten taxable years so long as the NOL occurred in 1976 or later. With
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, however, Congress severely limited the ten-
year carryback "window" period for commercial banks. In the House of
Representatives' Ways and Means Committee Report issued prior to the Tax
Reform Act, the Committee looked at the discrepancy between the treatment
of commercial banks and other types of entities. It noted that while
"commercial banks ... may carry net operating losses (NOLs) back to the
prior ten taxable years and forward to the succeeding five taxable years,"
taxpayers that did not qualify as commercial banks or financial institutions
302 131 CONG. REc. E4100 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1985) (statement of Rep. Anderson).
303 Id.
304 id.
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could only "carry net operating losses back to the prior three taxable years
and forward to the succeeding fifteen years.
3 5
After examining the difference between carryback provisions for
financial institutions and the treatment of other taxpayers, the Ways and
Means Committee concluded that "net operating losses incurred by financial
institutions such as commercial banks and thrift institutions should be
-306treated in the same manner as [ ] other taxpayers." Apparently, the
Committee believed "that an election should be available to commercial
banks to treat all of their net operating losses in the same manner as the net
operating losses of other taxpayers."
30
Unfortunately, no further explanation is offered as to how or why the
Committee reached this conclusion. Moreover, there was not any testimony
that would shed light upon the Committee's ultimate decision to repeal the
carryback provision for commercial banks. However, one article suggests
that Congress realized that the large NOLs incurred by thrifts in the early
1980's was essentially a thing of the past when it repealed the 1969
carryback provision. 308 This hints at the possibility that Congress repealed
the special carryback provision because it was aware that an era of bad-debt
NOLs was coming to an end, and thus the special ten-year carryback
provision was no longer justified.
Although Congress wanted to repeal the ten-year carryback provision
completely, it recognized that an immediate, total repeal of the provision
"could have an unnecessarily adverse impact upon the deferred tax accounts
that such [banks with large net operating losses from the early 1980s] keep
for financial and regulatory accounting purposes. 30 9 So as to lessen any
unnecessarily adverse impact, Congress retained a limited version of the ten-
year carryback provision. In its repeal of the provision, Congress made an
allowance for bad-debt losses of commercial banks and provided that only
"the portion of the NOL [resulting from bad-debt loss] for any taxable year
beginning after December 31, 1986 and before January 1, 1994" could be
considered an NOL carryback to each of the preceding ten taxable years
prior to the taxable year of such loss. 
310
'0' H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 592 (1985).
306 id.
307 House Ways and Means Committee Report on the Revenue Reconciliation Act, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Oct. 23, 1987, available at LEXIS, Taxation Library.
30S See Ernst and Whinney Study of Tax Reform Provisions Relating to the Financial Services
Industry, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 16, 1986, available at LEXIS, Taxation Library.
309 General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 10, 1987, available
at LEXIS, Taxation Library.
310 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 99-514 (Oct. 22, 1986) (emphasis added).
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Taking into account this allowance, a commercial bank's NOL under
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 can be carried back to the preceding ten years
only if the loss occurred as a result of bad debt and between the calendar
years of 1987 and 1993. Otherwise, under today's provision, a bank's NOL
is limited to a carryback of two years or a carryover of twenty years. 31' The
revenue effect of this provision was "estimated to decrease fiscal year
budget receipts by $59 million in 1988, $93 million in 1989, $92 million in
1990, and $77 million in 1991.
'312
c. Reactions to the repeal of the ten-year NOL carryback
In response to the repeal of the ten-year NOL carryback, the banking
community argued that the 1986 amendment was inequitable and untimely.
For example, in Cannon's letter to Representative Anderson, Cannon made
it clear that he felt that restricting the ten-year carryback provision to bad-
debt loss occurring between 1987 and 1993 would harm the commercial
banking sector. 313 According to Cannon, the repeal of the ten-year NOL
carryback for commercial banks "ignor[ed] the lessons of recent experience
[from the 1982-92 housing depression] and .. .could set the stage for
crippling housing finance in the United States." 314 On a more general level,
Cannon feared that the repeal of the ten-year NOL carryback for commercial
banks would "gut the system of tax incentives directed toward helping
consumers realize the American dream of home ownership."
315
d. Conclusions
Today, a corporation, regardless of whether it is a financial institution
or not, may carry back an NOL suffered in any year to the previous two
taxable years and carry it forward and apply it against its taxable income in
the next twenty taxable years. 316 After reviewing the legislative history of
the enactment and the subsequent repeal of the ten-year NOL carryback
provision for commercial banks, it is clear that Congress initially enacted the
provision in 1969 in order to provide an extra measure of protection to
commercial banks in the event that a particularly harmful bad-debt loss
"'' I.R.C. § 172(b).
312 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT
OF 1986 (Comm. Print 1987).
313 131 CONG. REC. E4100 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1985) (statement of Rep. Anderson).
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 I.R.C. § 172(b).
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occurred. While Congress' reasons for repealing the general provision are
not as clear, it is significant that Congress repealed the provision only after
the bad-debt losses of the early 1980s were coming to an end. Moreover,
Congress retained the ten-year carryback window for bad-debt losses
occurring between the calendar years of 1987 and 1993. However, outside
of those narrow parameters, the legislative history makes clear that
commercial banks should not continue to be treated differently from other
taxpayers in terms of carryback provisions. Thus, an argument could be
made that in the event that commercial banks are exposed to a high risk of
devastating bad-debt loss at some time in the future, a ten-year NOL
carryback provision may be appropriate.
2. Japanese Legislation
a. Suspension of refund of corporate income tax by using the net-loss
carryback since 1992
Similarly to the U.S. tax treatment, Japanese tax law recognizes the
carryback and carryforward of "net losses" and the tax deductibility of such
losses so carriedback or carriedforward. The definition of a "net loss" under
Japanese tax law is similar to the definition of an NOL under U.S. tax law.
The CTA defines a net loss as the excess of deductible losses and expenses
over gross income. Similarly, the IRC defines a net operating loss as the
excess of deductions over gross income for corporations.3 17 Pursuant to the
basic rule under the CTA, all Japanese corporations, including banks, have
been entitled to carry back net losses over a one-year period and to carry
them forward for a period of five years. Under this basic rule prescribed in
the CTA, a taxpayer corporation may file an amended tax retum for the prior
year reducing its taxable income for that year by an amount corresponding to
the net-loss carryback. In this way, it may be entitled to claim a refund and
thereby recoup the corporate income tax that it already paid for the previous
year. Any net-loss not used up in offsetting taxable income in the prior year
can be carried forward and applied against taxable income from the next five
fiscal years. Under the basic rule, a taxpayer corporation can choose to
forgo the loss carryback and simply carry the loss forward.
However, the effect of the relevant CTA provisions of the above-
mentioned refund has been suspended by virtue of a special tax statute that
317 Id. 172(c), (d).
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was enacted in 1992 and promulgated as of April 1 of that year.3"' Thus,
even today, no Japanese corporation, bank or otherwise, may claim a refund
of any part of its corporate income tax paid in connection with a previous
fiscal year by carrying back the net-loss that it has suffered in the present
year. As a result, net losses may only be carried forward. An exception to
this refund suspension exists in cases of dissolution, transfer of a whole
business, commencement of reorganization procedures under the
Corporation Reorganization Law, or other similar circumstances with
respect to a taxpayer corporation. The purpose of this suspension of refund,
as proposed by the MOF and NTA, was to raise a portion of the additional
tax revenue necessary to reduce the government's huge accumulated
financial deficit.
It should be noted that this suspension of refund has been applied
since 1992 to financial institutions and non-financial institutions alike, even
though the Japanese government itself recognized as early as 1991 the
necessity for prompt charge-offs of distressed bank loans resulting from the
collapse of the "bubble" economy. Needless to say, this suspension of
refund has deprived Japanese banks and other companies of a substantial
amount of the tax incentive that used to be given for the prompt charge-off
of their distressed loans. This move is strikingly different from the actions
the United States adopted for financial institutions during its era of economic
hardship for banks and thrifts. The Japanese government has adopted a
policy that is diametrically opposed to that of the United States with respect
to the issue of the carryback of net operating losses suffered by financial
institutions. Ironically, this comes just at the beginning of an unprecedented
crisis for Japanese financial institutions.
b. Anti-major-bank taxation by the Tokyo metropolitan government
As we have seen, there are very few instances of pro-bank tax
legislation in Japan. Instead, a powerful movement for the adoption of anti-
318 The relevant provision of the statute provides as follows:
The provision of Article 81, Paragraph 1 of the CTA (including the case of application mutatis
mutandis in Article 145, Paragraph 1 of the same Act) shall not apply to a corporation's net-loss
amount ("net-loss amount" as defined in Article 2, Item 20 of the same Act; hereinafter the same
in this Article) which has arisen in each accounting period which ends during the period between
April 1, 1992 and March 31, 2002; except for the deficit amount of the accounting period as
stated in Article 81, Paragraph 4 (including the case of being applicable mutatis mutandis in
Article 145, Paragraph I; hereinafter the same in this Article) ...
Sozei tokubetsu sochi h6 [Special Tax Treatment Law] art. 66-14 (as amended by Law No. 13 of
2000) (Japan).
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bank tax legislation has recently emerged on the Japanese political scene,
despite the fact that almost all Japanese banks are still struggling to
* overcome their current financial predicament. For instance, the Tokyo
metropolitan government recently enacted a new local tax law, 319 designed
to raise about 110 billion yen per year from approximately thirty major
banks with branches or offices located within the jurisdiction. This new tax
law changes the parameters (i.e., tax base and tax rate) of the existing
calculation formula of Tokyo's Enterprise Tax on Corporations (h6jinjigy5
zei [Enterprise Tax]), which the Tokyo metropolitan government is
authorized to impose on all corporations within its jurisdiction under the
national tax law. Specifically, under the new law, the Tokyo metropolitan
government imposes a three percent 32 Enterprise Tax on the gross revenue
(before charge-offs of bad loans and other deductible charges) of only those
major banks that have aggregate funds of not less than five trillion yen and
have a branch or office within the Tokyo metropolitan government's
jurisdiction.32' At the same time, the government imposes a 10% tax on the
net profit of other banks and corporations. Under the previous local law,
those same major banks were subject to a 10% Enterprise Tax on their
income (gross revenue minus loan charge-offs and other deductible charges),
just the same as all other business corporations. The major banks had been
paying the largest amounts of this previous Enterprise Tax during the
"bubble" period because, during that period, the amount of their Enterprise
Taxes had been calculated according to their income (net profit), which had
reached record highs year after year. This treatment has, however, yielded
only meager revenues for Tokyo in recent years. One major reason is that
banks that have begun to charge off their huge bad loans that accumulated
during Japan's speculative financial bubble and thus decreased their income
dramatically. The new treatment is designed to raise approximately 110
billion yen per fiscal year. This amount is the average amount of the
previous-type Enterprise Tax collected annually from the banks in question
during the "bubble era," without being affected by the amount of charge-offs
of their irrecoverable loans. Further, this treatment will apply to those major
319 T~ky6-to ni okeru gink6-gy6 t6 ni taisuru jigy6-zei no kazei hyjun t6 no tokurei ni kansuru j6rei
[Local Tax Act Concerning the Special Treatments Applicable to Corporations Engaging in Banking
Business, etc. in the jurisdiction of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government for the Tax Base, etc. Under the
Enterprise Tax], Local Act of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government No. 145 of 2000 (Japan) [hereinafter
Tokyo Special Bank Taxation Act].
320 This 3% tax rate is reduced to 2% for certain special financial institutions established under a
special statute, such as the Bank of Japan and the Central Bank for Commercial and Industrial Cooperative.
See Tokyo Special Bank Taxation Act, supra note 320, art. 5.
321 Tokyo Special Bank Taxation Act, supra note 320, art. 3.
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banks only from April 1, 2000 through March 31, 2005,322 the period of time
during which the amount of net profits of those banks, after appropriate bad
debt deductions, will most likely be nominal because of the projected huge
number of distressed loans to be charged-off during such period.
Accordingly, this new tax treatment seems to be designed to raise the
Enterprise Tax collected from the major banks to an amount higher than ever
collected from them by the Tokyo metropolitan government. Thus, this new
local tax law will deprive those major banks of one of the major tax
incentives for the prompt charge-off of distressed loans.
Bankers and some commentators strongly criticized the Governor of
the Tokyo metropolitan government, Shintaro Ishihara, when he made public
the proposal for this new local tax law. They argued that the proposal not
only oversteps the authority delegated to a local tax law under the national
tax law 323 but the proposal also unreasonably discriminates against the banks
in question and thus unequivocally violates Article Fourteen of the Japanese
Constitution, which assures the right to equal treatment. The Japanese
government also published, without precedent, an official statement that
questioned the constitutionality and the legality of this new local law given
the national tax law.
324
The Tokyo metropolitan legislature approved, almost unanimously
(with only one dissenting vote), the enactment of this new local tax law
based on overwhelming support from its constituents, who, like most
Japanese, have no sympathy for major banks, which are believed to have
long favored corporate clients over individual customers and small
businesses. According to a recent poll conducted by a leading newspaper in
Japan, 59% of respondents throughout Japan were in favor of this new local
tax law proposal and 53% of those polled disagreed with the observation that
this new local law was unfair and discriminatory against major banks.325
The New York Times quoted a banking analyst who stated, "[Governor
Ishihara] could have said he was going to tax NEC, Hitachi or Sony, [b]ut
banks are an easy target because Japanese like Sony TV's and NEC
322 id.
323 See Chih6-zei h6 [Local Tax Act], Law No. 226 of 1950, art. 72-19 (Japan).
324 Kakugi ketd rydkai [Oral Agreement by the Cabinet], Gink6-gyo ni Taisuru Toky6-to no Gaikei
Hyjun Kazei ni tsuite [Re: Tokyo Metropolitan's Proposed Local Tax Law for the Assessment by
Estimation on the Basis of the Size of Business to be Applied to Banking Business, etc.], Feb. 22, 2000
(Japan), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kakugikettei/2000/toukyouto-tihouzei.html (last visited May 18, 2000).
325 See To No Gaikei-hyjun-kazei, "Sansei" 59% [59% support the assessment by estimation on the
basis of the size of business to be introduced by the Tokyo metropolitan government], ASAHI SHINBUN,
morning edition, Feb. 23, 2000, at 1-2.
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computers, but no one really likes Japanese banks. 326 The Washington Post
suggested and the above poll arguably implied that many Japanese disdain
bankers as overpaid and reckless businessmen whose lending policies were
largely responsible for the financial "bubble" and its subsequent collapse.327
It has been widely reported that voters were irked that the Japanese
government has channeled billions of yen into the major commercial banks
328in recent years. Moreover, it has also frequently reported that many
Japanese customers believe that Japanese banks consistently have offered
paltry interest rates to depositors and refused new loans to many promising
customers. 329 Governor Ishihara was shrewd enough to take advantage of
the usually silent voices of the ordinary Japanese taxpayers to accomplish
his political goal of raising necessary funds to shore up the finances of the
Tokyo metropolitan government, which is now teetering on the brink of
insolvency.
330
Encouraged by the enactment of this "anti-major banks" local tax law
in Tokyo, the ruling party in the legislature of Osaka Prefecture submitted a
copy-cat bill for deliberation on March 30, 2000, the exact date of the local
tax law's enactment. This bill was passed in May in the legislature of Osaka
Prefecture. This example implies that there is a strong antagonism
throughout Japan that could easily lead to the passage of additional anti-bank
tax legislation at any moment and might potentially prevent the Japanese
government or other local governments from moving to set up any favorable
tax treatment for commercial banks.
The first sign of such strong public resentment toward Japanese banks
emerged during the enactment of the jusen companies "bailout" law 3 3 1 in
1996. Given the expected length and magnitude of thejusen bad loan clean-
up, the Japanese electorate responded vociferously when it was told that the
government must bail out the jusen housing loan companies for their
misguided investments during the bubble era. Japanese citizens have taken
the position that jusen companies and, among others, the banking industry,
were responsible for creating a large portion of the problem and should
326 Stephanie Storm, Banks React With Shock to a Plan by Tokyo to Tax Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
2000, at C4.
327 See Clay Chandler, Tokyo Tries to Claim More Bank Revenue, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2000, at
E02.
328 See, e.g., id.
329 See, e.g., id.
331 See, e.g., Storm, supra note 326, at C4.
3,' Tokutei jyotaku kin'yu senmon kaisha no saiken saimu no shori sokushin t6 ni kansuru tokubetsu
sochi h6 [Special Treatment Law Concerning the Expedited Resolution of Debts of Certain Jusen Housing
Loan Companies], Law No. 93 of 1996 (Japan).
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therefore be forced to pay the majority of the clean-up costs.33 2 Concerned
taxpayers have organized to discuss government bailout proposals and to
recommend specific legislative action.333 As a result, the ruling parties
seriously considered the possibility of adopting some anti-bank tax
legislation in order to minimize the governmental expenditure for wiping-out
those bad debt losses while not directly requiring banks to contribute to the
clean-up. The anti-bank tax legislation would include the removal of the
0.3% guaranteed deduction under the General Reserve.
IV. DID THE JAPANESE TAX SYSTEM FRUSTRATE THE PROMPT DISPOSITION
OF DISTRESSED BANK LOANS?
The above comparative study between the United States and Japanese
tax treatments in connection with distressed bank loans during the 1980s and
1990s reveals that in virtually all respects, the United States has been more
flexible and generous than Japan with regards to the ability of banks to
recognize and to utilize deductible losses with respect to their distressed
loans for tax purposes. In particular, under the "Reasonable Business
Judgment" doctrine, U.S. banks seem to have been able to enjoy earlier
recognition of deductible losses with respect to their troubled loans, as
compared with Japanese banks, at least so long as one does not take the
existence of the General Reserve system in Japan into consideration.
Although the 0.3% blanket guaranteed deduction under the General
Reserve system, which had been maintained up until 1998, had provided
Japanese banks with some tax benefits derived from the discrepancy
between this 0.3% guaranteed deduction and the bank's actual loan loss ratio
until 1991,334 such tax benefits have been almost completely non-existent
since 1993. Moreover, it has been frequently pointed out that, prior to 1993,
such blanket guaranteed deduction had provided Japanese banks only with
disincentives for facilitating charge-offs or making loss provisions for their
non-performing loans.335 So long as this 0.3% General Reserve covered the
bank's aggregate potentially distressed loans, bank management would not
332 See Howard M. Felson, Closing the Book on Jusen: An Account of the Bad Loan Crisis and a New
Chapter for Securitarization in Japan, 47 DUKE L. J. 567, 582 (1997).
333 See Toshio Aritake, Japan Releases Data on Bad Debts of Troubled Housing Loan Companies,
BANKING DAILY (BNA), Jan. 22, 1996, available at LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABus File (discussing the
creation of the "Association to Ask Banks to Accept Their Responsibility as Creditors").
334 As frequently pointed out, where the tax rules allow an increase in provision as a deduction from
profits but where the total allowable provision is limited to a percentage of loans, as was the case in Japan
up until 1998, there is a cash flow benefit to a bank if it increases its loan loss provision up to the allowable
amount (although this will reduce earnings and capital). See BEAT'IiE ETAL., supra note 76, at 32.
335 See, e.g., Okina, supra note 86, at 25.
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have any incentive to charge off or make loss provisions for those distressed
loans in order to improve the bank's financial statements cosmetically. Even
if the aggregate amount of those loans had exceeded the 0.3% threshold, the
existence of such blanket guaranteed deduction system would arguably have
induced bank management to postpone taking a proactive stance with regard
to dealing with mounting non-performing loans for the purpose of avoiding
any possible attack by shareholders and other stakeholders in the hope that
such excess amount might be wiped out by the future tax deductions to be
automatically provided under the system. In short, such an automatic
blanket deduction system might cause moral hazards for bank management
if the bank regulatory agency fails to effectively monitor and supervise the
conduct of bank management.
This reluctance of bank management to take any prophylactic
measures to deal with the banks' troubled loans might have been amplified
by the delay in the introduction of accounting rules providing for the
recognition of deferred tax assets in unconsolidated financial statements
under the Japanese GAAP. Since the management of Japanese banks has
traditionally been inclined to focus on and maintain an ongoing level of
reported earnings in their financial statements on an unconsolidated basis,
the lack of rules providing for the recognition of deferred tax assets, which
would cushion against the full impact of loan loss provisions on reported
earnings on an unconsolidated basis, seems to provide a substantial
disincentive for banks to establish loan loss provisions for their distressed
loans prophylactically before those loans become entitled to the bad debt
336deduction for tax purposes.
The above comparative study by and large endorses the frequent
observation of scholars that the tax regime of the country in which a bank is
located is likely to influence the provisioning decisions by the bank
management and thus influence the size of loan loss provisions. There is
some discretion over the type and size of provisions in most countries. In
exercising such discretion, banks may charge off their bad loans and make
loan loss provisions in such a way as to improve earnings, regulatory capital
and cash flow as much as possible.
On balance, the tax regime of Japan has provided less adequate tax
incentives for banks to expedite the disposition of their bad loans337 than the
tax regime of the United States. The difference in the speed and promptness
of charge-offs of distressed loans between U.S. banks and Japanese banks
336 See supra Part III.C.
337 See Kanaya & Woo, supra note 11, at 11.
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seems to be attributable, at least partially, to the differences between the
U.S. and Japanese tax treatments for troubled loans. For instance, while the
total amount of assets past due ninety days or more, together with assets in
non-accrual status, held by FDIC-insured U.S. commercial banks amounted
to $76.98 billion dollars as of the end of December 1991, the total amount of
loan assets past due ninety days or more, together with loan assets from
bankrupt entities, held by city banks in Japan was reported as 8455 billion
yen as of the end of March 1993. On the other hand, the aggregate amount
of net loan and lease charge-offs of all FDIC-insured U.S. commercial banks
during 1992 through 1994 reached $54.14 billion dollars (70.33% of the
above aggregate amount of distressed assets as of December 1991).
Meanwhile, the aggregate amount of loan charge-offs (including net
additions to the Special Depreciation Account) of city banks in Japan during
1993 through 1995 reached 5825 billion yen (68.89% of the above aggregate
amount of distressed assets as of March 1993). Note, however, that the
above figure for the aggregate amount of loan charge-offs of Japanese city
banks does not incorporate appropriate netting-outs (i.e., that the amount of
loans for which some reserves to the Special Depreciation Account were
first established and thereafter were specifically charged off within the
relevant period is double-counted and loan recovery is not taken into account
in the calculation of such figure). Thus, it would be reasonable to conclude
that U.S. banks had been disposing of their distressed loans more quickly
than Japanese banks, at least up until the mid 1990s. Since the Japanese tax
system provided less adequate tax incentives than that of the United States at
least up until the 1998 Amendments, the management of Japanese banks had
arguably been less strongly motivated to charge-off their banks' distressed
loans under the Japanese system.
V. CONCLUSION
Surprisingly enough, in both the United States and Japan, there has so
far been no comprehensive comparative study highlighting the tax
treatments for distressed bank loans in these two economically powerful
countries. 338 Moreover, a number of commentators 339 (including those at the
MOF) 340 have argued that Japanese tax treatments seem to be more generous
for banks and other financial institutions than those of the United States
This argument is based principally upon the fact that since 1986 the United
338 As one of the preliminary studies in this area, see Yoshida, supra note 61.
319 Id. at 57.
340 See TAKAHASHI, supra note 96, at 12.
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States, unlike Japan, has not allowed any deduction for major banks with
respect to their loan loss reserves.
Detailed and multi-dimensioned analyses on the actual case
precedents and tax practices in both countries reveal that Japanese tax
treatments of distressed bank loans are, by and large, less favorable than
U.S. treatments, as we have seen in the foregoing. This may well partially
be the result of the strong resentment felt by the public toward commercial
banks in Japan. 34' It is argued that this seems to be the outcome of the
strong influence exerted by powerful banks (through the so-called "main
342bank system") on Japanese industry. Such public resentment has been
amplified by the frenzy of speculation in stocks and real estate that Japanese
banks allowed, and even encouraged, during the 1980s. With a negative
predisposition vis-A-vis commercial banks firmly fixed in the minds of the
Japanese public, the Japanese government seemed to respond by taking a
rigorous position in its tax treatment of distressed bank loans. Such
governmental policy partially deprived Japanese banks of their tax
incentives for the prompt and voluntary charge-off of their distressed loans.
In addition, variations in tax treatments for distressed bank loans between
the United States and Japan, together with different approaches to the
recognition of deferred tax assets in unconsolidated financial statements up
until 1998, imply that there are differences between these two countries in
the consequences of establishing loan loss reserves for financial institutions'
earnings and capital.
It is vital for Japan to harmonize its overall corporate income tax
treatments with those of the United States, including those applicable to
distressed bank loans. This would establish a level playing field for
Japanese banks to compete with U.S. banks in the global market. In
addition, it would help Tokyo's financial and equity markets keep up with
markets in New York and other world markets. Japan must, therefore,
develop a workable tax scheme for dealing with distressed bank loans, one
that will be consistent with that of the United States and that can be
introduced into the existing Japanese framework for corporate income tax
without creating serious practical difficulties. Of course, the U.S. model is
not the only model that the Japanese system could follow. However,
considering that both the U.S. corporate income tax system and the Japanese
corporate income tax system adopt the concept of Haig-Simons income as
141 See Part III.G.2.b.
342 For a discussion of this strong influence through "main bank system," see generally PAUL SHEARD
ET AL., NIHON No MEIN BANKU SISUTEMU [MAIN BANK SYSTEM IN JAPAN] (Masaki Shiratori et al. trans.,
1996).
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their key concept, 343 the Japanese system for bank taxation should follow
that of the United States so long as the U.S. system is moving in a direction
that is consistent with the global trend towards mark-to-market accounting
344
and uniform capital adequacy rules for financial institutions. Since the most
powerful and influential competitors of Japanese banks are currently U.S.
banks, following the U.S. system provides the best opportunity to level the
playing field of competition between Japanese and U.S. banks in the global
market.
In addition, it should be noted that tax academics and practitioners
have recently placed more emphasis on the increasing need for the
harmonization of corporate income tax rules to eliminate the distortion of
business activities and the inefficient distribution of resources in the era of
globalization. 345 The necessity for a harmonized global income tax system
has been advocated more strongly in the area of the commercial banking
business than in other businesses because of the global trend toward mark-
to-market accounting rules, 34 6 and the recent move toward more uniform
capital adequacy rules for bank regulatory purposes 347 resulting from a surge
in trans-border financial transactions. In order to provide an arena for
global competition in which all financial institutions of the world are put on
an equal footing, harmonized capital adequacy rules, which are designed to
provide both security to the banking system and to create a level playing
field in which banks can operate, 148 must be formulated, as well as a
harmonized corporate income tax system for financial institutions.349
With these considerations in mind, what kind of approach should be
adopted for the reform of the Japanese corporate income tax system? One
promising direction would be to move the Japanese corporate income tax
system closer to a model of measuring income based on "economic income"
or Haig-Simons income by means of a mark-to-market system, especially for
the tax treatment of distressed bank loans. It has been repeatedly pointed out
343 See supra Part II.A.
34 See Kin'yU Sh6hin Ni Kakaru Kaikei Kijun [Accounting Standards With Respect to Financial
Products] (Kigy6 Kaikei Shingikai [Business Accounting Council] 1999). See also Financial Instruments:
Recognition And Measurement, International Accounting Standards (IAS) No. 39 (International
Accounting Standards Committee 1998); Accounting For Certain Investments In Debt And Equity
Securities, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 115 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd.
1993).
345 See, e.g., KANEKO, supra note 32, at 97-98.
346 See supra note 344.
347 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
348 See id.
349 Although there is a move to harmonize capital adequacy rules, the lack of harmonization of tax
and accounting rules suggests that banks are not yet competing on a level playing field on a worldwide
basis. BEATTIE ET AL., supra note 76, at 32.
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that improving the measurement of taxable income is an integral step in
promoting fairness by treating taxpayers in an evenhanded manner. 350 It has
also been frequently argued that improving the measurement of income also
increases the economic neutrality, as well as the economic efficiency, of the
tax system by reducing disparities in treatment between various investments
and industries under the tax law.351 Given the strength of the proposition
that measuring taxable income based upon Haig-Simons income through a
mark-to-market system may achieve a relatively optimal income taxation in
light of considerations of fairness and neutrality, 352 it is desirable for the
Japanese income tax system to apply the mark-to-market approach in
measuring taxable income to as many areas as possible.
Based upon the above analysis, one could interpret the 1998
Amendment as an integral step in revising the tax system for distressed bank
loans in accordance with the mark-to-market approach.35 3 It eliminated the
restrictions on the deductibility of partially worthless loans for income tax
purposes 354 and thus removed one of the major restrictions on the
deductibility of distressed bank loans that are inconsistent with the mark-to-
market approach. The introduction of the mark-to-market approach in the
assessment of financial assets held by financial institutions for the purpose
of tax accounting in April 2000355 was also an important move toward the
expansion of the mark-to-market approach in the Japanese corporate income
tax system.
These moves lack, however, the necessary "finishing touches" since a
mark-to-market assessment cannot be used at all in the appraisal of ordinary
loan assets for the purpose of income tax accounting. As mentioned above,
under the U.S. tax law, banks and other financial institutions may, to some
extent, accelerate their deductions for tax purposes with respect to a loan's
decrease in market value by marking such loan to the market. It is clear that
such treatment offers banks and financial institutions more tax incentives to
charge off or otherwise dispose of their distressed loans and thus could
311 See, e.g., NAKAZATO, supra note 50, at 77.
"' See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH,
126-30 (1984); THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND
SIMPLICITY 1,202 (1985).
352 Although this article is not intended to examine the legitimacy of this proposition, it should be
noted that in both the United States and Japan, this proposition has become pervasive and gradually been
reflected in their respective actual tax legislations in recent years. See Evans, supra note 44, at 825;
Nakazato, supra note 44, at 29; NAKAZATO, supra note 50, at 55-60, 62-79.
353 See RYOJI TAKEDA, Sonkin, Ekikin no Ninsiki, Sokutei [Recognition and Measurement of
Deductible Losses and Taxable Incomes], 51 KIGYO KAIKEI 108, 115.
354 See supra Part III.B.l.a.
355 See supra Part III.D.2.
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facilitate the improvement of their financial conditions. From this
perspective, the Japanese legislature and tax authority should adopt tax
treatment provisions similar to those set forth in Section 475 of the IRC. In
this regard, Article 33, Paragraph 2 of the CTA, pursuant to which the NTA
has taken a stringent position with respect to the tax deductibility of a
partially-worthless loan and has seemed to have adopted the Necessity for
the Liquidation of All Assets of the Debtor theory, should be eliminated.
This provision had lost all of its rationale by the time the latest "after
markets" for loan assets emerged in Japan in the late 1990s, 356 and is no
longer consistent with the current GAAP in Japan, which, in principle,
employs a mark-to-market approach in assessing financial assets.
Obviously, Japanese accounting rules for banks have been rapidly moving in
the direction of marking to market.358 Article 33, Paragraph 2 of the CTA
has become quite inconsistent with this move and has, to some extent,
deprived Japanese banks of tax incentives to expedite the disposition of their
distressed loans and circumvent unnecessary tapping-out of their retained
earnings. Further, the provision has been abused by the Japanese tax
authority as one of the theoretical tools employed to unreasonably
disapprove the prompt recognition by banks and other financial institutions
of tax losses for their distressed loans. Accordingly, in order to procure a
level playing field for competition between Japanese and U.S. banks and to
move the Japanese income tax system closer to a model of measuring
income based on Haig-Simons income, the elimination of this provision
should be effected quickly.
In addition, the revival of the "conformity rules" should be considered
on the condition that the bank regulatory power becomes completely
independent of the MOF and thus the conflict of interest between bank
regulatory purposes and tax purposes created by the single administration
under the MOF is eliminated. The U.S. experience in the last twenty years
has proved the effectiveness of "direct" tax incentives for bad debt
deductions obtained through the U.S.-type "conformity rule" and its
facilitation of charge-offs of distressed bank loans. Alternatively, if it is
practically difficult for the Japanese tax authority to adopt the U.S.-type
"conformity rule" without any assurance of procuring necessary tax
356 See supra Part III.B. b.
31, See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
358 Japanese banks began disclosing unrealized capital gains on securities in 1990 in accordance with
accounting rules established by the Federation of the Bankers Associations of Japan. In addition, the MOF
Securities Bureau has required banks that are subject to the disclosure requirements of the Securities and
Exchange Law to disclose such gains since December 1990. SCOTT & IWAHARA, supra note 27, at 43.
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revenues to cover governmental expenditures, the adoption of the following
proposal for minimizing the administrative burdens entailed by the review of
worthlessness of distressed loans by the tax authority might be worthy of
further consideration. The content of such proposal is as follows: (1) allow
taxpayers to deduct bad debts whenever they are charged off for financial
accounting purposes; (2) impose income taxes on any recoveries of deducted
debts at the higher of the taxpayer's marginal rate in the year of the
deduction and that in the year of the recovery; and (3) assess an interest
charge on this income tax from the time of the deduction to the time of
recovery.
3 59
Further, whenever economically necessary, the suspension of anti-
bank legislation and introduction of pro-bank legislation with a limited
duration period should be considered on timely basis. A comparative study
between the impact of the pro-bank tax legislation in the United States
during the period from 1976 through 1993 and that of the anti-bank tax
legislation in Japan in recent years360 seems to suggest the necessity of
deliberate and rational consideration in a broader perspective on this point.
In any event, in this era of globalization, the need for the constant
review and adjustment of tax treatments in accordance with global trends
will continue to increase, especially in the area of distressed bank loans as
well as other matters. Furthermore, the tax treatments must be based upon a
wide range of perspectives derived from tax, accounting, and financial
market regulatory systems.
359 Am. Tax'n Ass'n Comm. on Income Measurement, A Time Value of Money Approach to Bad
Debts, 40 TAX NOTES 1075 (1988).
'60 See supra Part III.G.
VOL. 10 No. 3
MAY 2001 TAX TREA TMENTS FOR DISTRESSED BANK LOANS
Appendix 1: ROE, ROA and Yields Comparison3
61
A. ROE Comparison
B. ROA Comparison
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361 Kanaya & Woo, supra note 11, at 23.
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APPENDIX 2: SUMMARY OF THE U.S. TAX TREATMENTS FOR
RESTRUCTURING OF TROUBLED LOANS
36 2
Alterations Pursuant To Terms Of The Debt
Instrument Modification?
G enerally ..................................................................... N o
Substitution of obligor ..................................................... Yes
Addition/Deletion of co-obligor ...................................... Yes
Recourse to nonrecourse .................................................. Yes
Nonrecourse to recourse .................................................. Yes
Reclassification of debt instrument as equity .................. Yes
Conversion of debt to equity
by obligor .......................................................... Y es
by holder ....................................................... No
Exercise of option other than conversion option, either Yes
not unilateral, of by holder to defer/reduce
interest/principal ..............................................................
Exercise of option, other ............................................. No
Failure to exercise option ........................................... No
Other alterations pursuant to terms (general rule) ........... No
Alterations Other Than Pursuant To Terms Of
The Debt Instrument
C hange in yield ................................................................ Y es
Timing of payments ......................................................... Yes
Failure to perform ............................................................ Yes, if holder
agrees and
forbearance
exceeds 2+year
safe harbor
No, otherwise.
Substitution of obligor ..................................................... Yes
Addition of co-obligor ..................................................... Yes
Recourse to nonrecourse .................................................. Yes
Nonrecourse to recourse .................................................. Yes
Change in security ........................................................... Yes
for nonrecourse
for recourse
Change in priority ............................................................ Yes
Conversion of debt to equity ............................................ Yes
Reclassification of debt to equity .................................... Yes
Change in customary accounting & financial covenants. Yes
If So, Significant?
Nonrecourse-no;
recourse-yes, unless exception
Only if change in payment
expectations
Yes, unless exception
No
Yes
Yes
See Alterations Other Than
Pursuant To Terms Of The
Debt Instrument, below
Within .25%/5% threshold-no;
not within-yes
=/<5yrs/50% original term-no
>above period-facts &
circumstances
See "Timing of payments"
above
Nonrecourse-no;
recourse-yes, unless exception
Only if change in payment
expectations
Yes, unless exception
No
If substantial change
Only if change in payment
expectations
Only if change in payment
expectations
Yes, generally
Yes, generally
No
362 This table is an excerpt of the table that appears in Bravenec & Hurtt, supra note 272, at 376.
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